朝日記241028 その９ 「翻訳 意識のハードプロブレム」

 

朝日記241028　その２　目次　「翻訳　　意識のハードプロブレム」

朝日記241028　その９　「翻訳　　意識のハードプロブレム」

 

Reference 41to 70

 ( each number below  is read with count plus 40, for instance number 2 below is 42)

1. ^ Levine, J. 1983. “Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 354–361.
2. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r} Weisberg, Josh. "The Hard Problem of Consciousness". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
3. ^ Seager, William. "Are Zombies Logically Possible?". www.utsc.utoronto.ca. Retrieved 2020-09-03.
4. ^ Kaszniak, Alfred W.; Scott, Andrew C. (2007). "Zombie Killer". Association of Scientific Studies of Consciousness. S2CID 14891432.
5. ^ Polger, Tom. "Zombies: Entry". host.uniroma3.it. Archived from the original on 2020-06-15. Retrieved 2020-09-03.
6. ^ Kirk, Robert (2019), "Zombies", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-09-03
7. ^ Jump up to:^a b David Chalmers (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, pp. 153–56. Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN 0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.)
8. ^ Dennett, Daniel (1999), "The Zombie Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?", Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture
9. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Martine Nida-Rümelin; Donnchadh O Conaill (2019). "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 2020-09-03.
10. ^ Bourget, David; Chalmers, David J. (2014). "What Do Philosophers Believe?". Philosophical Studies. 170 (3): 465–500. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7. S2CID 254936498.
11. ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j} Chalmers, David (2003). "Consciousness and its Place in Nature". In Stich, Stephen P.; Warfield, Ted A. (eds.). Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 102–142. doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5. ISBN 9780470998762.
12. ^ Boutel, Adrian (2013). "How to be a Type-C Physicalist". Philosophical Studies. 164 (2): 301–320. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9854-2. S2CID 254941872.
13. ^ Jump up to:^a b Majeed, Raamy (September 2016). "The hard problem & its explanatory targets". Ratio. 29 (3): 298–311. doi:10.1111/rati.12103.
14. ^ Jump up to:^a b Levin, Janet (2008). "Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously". Mind and Language. 23 (4): 402–425. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00349.x.
15. ^ Mandik, Pete; Weisberg, Josh (2008). Wrenn, Chase (ed.). Type-Q Materialism. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
16. ^ Pereira, Roberto Horácio Sá (2016). "In Defence of Type-A Materialism". Diametros. 49 (49): 68–83. doi:10.13153/diam.49.2016.921.
17. ^ Yetter-Chappell, Helen (2017). "Dissolving Type-B Physicalism". Philosophical Perspectives. 31 (1): 469–498. doi:10.1111/phpe.12099.
18. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Ramsey, William (2019). "Eliminative Materialism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 1 April 2019.
19. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Frankish, K. (2016). "Illusionism as a theory of consciousness". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 23 (11–12): 11–39.
20. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Dennett, Daniel (2016). "Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 23 (11–12): 65–72.
21. ^ Carruthers, Peter (2016). "Higher-order theories of consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
22. ^ Carruthers, Peter (2005). "Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiments". Consciousness: essays from a higher-order perspective. Oxford University Press. pp. 79 ff. ISBN 978-0191535048.
23. ^ Carruthers, Glenn; Schier, Elizabeth (2012). "Dissolving the hard problem of consciousness" (PDF). Consciousness Online fourth conference. Retrieved 7 July 2014.
24. ^ Stango, Marco (Summer 2017). "A Deweyan assessment of three major tendencies in philosophy of consciousness". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 53 (3): 466–490. doi:10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.53.3.06. S2CID 148690536.
25. ^ Harris, Sam. "Making Sense #96". SamHarris.org. Sam Harris. Retrieved 27 August 2020. (25.45) TM:I think it will not be a mystery. Life is not a mystery anymore, but a hundred and fifty years ago many people thought that this is an irreducible mystery. (25:57) Harris:So you're not a fan anymore, if you ever were, of the framing by David Chalmers of the Hard Problem of Consciousness? Metzinger: No, that's so boring. I mean, that's last century. I mean, you know, we all respect Dave [Chalmers], and we know he is very smart and has got a very fast mind, no debate about that. But conceivability arguments are just very, very weak. If you have an ill-defined folk psychological umbrella term like "consciousness", then you can pull off all kinds of scenarios and zombie thought experiments. It doesn't really… It helped to clarify some issues in the mid 90's, but the consciousness community has listened to this and just moved on. I mean nobody of the serious researchers in the field thinks about this anymore, but it has taken on like a folkloristic life of its own. A lot of people talk about the Hard Problem who wouldn't be able to state what it consists in now.
26. ^ Garrett, Brian Jonathan (May 2006). "What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 72 (3): 576–588. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00584.x.
27. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Hacker, Peter (2010). "Hacker's challenge". The Philosophers' Magazine. 51 (51): 23–32. doi:10.5840/tpm2010517.
28. ^ Schaal, David W. (2005). "Naming Our Concerns About Neuroscience: A Review of Bennett and Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 84 (3): 683–692. doi:10.1901/jeab.2005.83-05. PMC 1389787. PMID 16596986.
29. ^ Dennett, Daniel C. (1979). "On the Absence of Phenomenology". In Gustafson, Donald F.; Tapscott, Bangs L. (eds.). Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 93–113.
30. ^ Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Penguin Books.