本篇paper代写- The European security council讨论了欧安会。欧安会是包括所有欧洲国家以及美国、加拿大在内的一次盛会，在二战后东西方关系史上是前所未有的。当苏联一心希望尽快召开欧安会时，英国却始终主张欧安会多边预备会谈不应该谈判实质性问题。英国为欧安会正式谈判设想了足够复杂的、多层次的会议组织结构，并且还构思了“归纳法”和“平行法”两种谈判方法，以便能够使西方各国的欧安会代表能够在欧安会谈判期间随心所欲地提出他们所关心的各种问题，从而形成并有效保持了对东方的压力。本篇paper代写由51due代写平台整理，供大家参考阅读。
The csce is a grand gathering that includes all European countries, as well as the United States and Canada. It is unprecedented in the history of east-west relations since the second world war. Prepared Britain to the European security council was divided into two aspects, on the one hand is for western union, mainly in safeguarding the interests of the whole western group as the ultimate goal, to keep the pressure on the east, strengthening the non-governmental exchanges between the two parts, and then to the Soviet union and eastern European countries the goal of peaceful evolution of the cold war struggle; On the other hand, it is the national goal to play the role of a great power in Europe and a great power in csce. In order to achieve these goals, the British side stressed the importance of western unity and firmly safeguard, side to design some negotiation strategies and methods, including multilateral preparatory talks to avoid the European security council negotiations substantive issues, determine the organization structure of the European security council, as well as "induction" and "parallel method" method, and stick to distinguish between negotiations and file drafting phase. Through the practice of these strategies, the west had a long advantage during the negotiations and maintained strong pressure on the Soviet union and eastern European countries.
The csce multilateral preparatory talks, a preparation for the formal conference, opened on 22 November 1972 and ended on 8 June 1973. Preparatory talks themselves are not simple things, during which the east and the west have been engaged in debates and struggles on various topics, among which the most important issue is whether the multilateral preparatory talks should negotiate substantive issues or not. The so-called "substantive issues" of the western alliance mainly refer to the "humanitarian" and "human rights" issues, as well as the "most-favoured-nation treatment" issues in the economic field. Among them, the "humanitarian" issue was very strange in the Soviet union and eastern Europe, but it was convenient for the western alliance to promote the "peaceful evolution" in the east, and the economic issue was the urgent need of the east, but it was likely to have to pay a huge price. The western alliance attaches great importance to "humanitarian" issues.
There are two opposing views within the western group on the csce preparatory talks: one represented by the United States and the other by Britain and France. The United States has repeatedly argued that preparatory meetings should negotiate substantive issues so that clear substantive agreements can be prepared in advance for formal negotiations to be ratified during the formal session. The United States wants to take advantage of the Soviet union's eagerness to convene the csce, forcing the Soviet union to pay a price on issues such as human contacts in exchange for western agreement to participate in the csce, so the multilateral preparatory talks should discuss substantive issues. The administration is clearly under pressure at home because if the preparatory talks don't get substantive, congress and the public will increase pressure on the administration to unilaterally withdraw U.S. troops from Europe, while undermining the Allies' support for the necessary troop increases. Both the Netherlands and the us want the west to be "unequivocal from the start" and then adjust as needed. Although Britain and France also advocated making the Soviet union pay the price, they all advocated that the preparatory multilateral talks should not talk about the substance, but only about the agenda and procedures. They oppose turning multilateral preparatory talks into csce pre-conferences. Both countries are more committed to this position. France had earlier suggested that substantive issues should be left to the committee of experts during the formal session. The closer it is to the csce, the more support France's proposition has gained within the European Community. The French claim was broadly supported by the British. However, the UK also believes that everything must depend on the situation. Moreover, while many western countries favor a detailed agenda, Britain wants to preserve the "ambiguity" of the csce agenda so that western representatives can make their own proposals without breaking any rules.
The reason why Britain believes that multilateral preparatory talks should not talk about substantive issues is mainly to avoid "early confrontation" and to continue to create favorable conditions for western participation by taking advantage of the Soviet union's eagerness to convene csce. If the west demands too soon, it will be hard to get the Soviet union to back down on that basis, and there will be little to gain from later negotiations. Eastern Europe and European neutral states may not pay much attention to what the western alliance has already said. "Once the elevator starts, it is unrealistic to want to go down again," said Britain, which wants "full flexibility" in any meeting of ministers. The British deputy ambassador to NATO, j.a. homson, then proposed the British agenda: the western declaration, the eastern declaration and the common ground. In this way, there can be something substantive without leading to debate. West Germany was "hooked" on the idea.
Britain thinks America underestimates two political problems. First, once multilateral preparations for the csce begin, no European government wants to be blamed for preventing the conference from taking place, except in the event of a serious Soviet invasion of Romania. Second, America ignores the growing convergence among the members of the "enlarged European Community". This consensus "arose from a natural sense of common interest and awakened in the work of European political cooperation". The fact that the csce has been chosen by western European states as one of the occasions to pursue a common foreign policy is itself an indication of their increasing coherence. In essence, the British aim is to ensure that western representatives can raise whatever issues they deem important on the csce "at will". Let the east move towards the demands of Britain, not the other way round. It became the official position of the western alliance, including the European Community and NATO, to "discreetly refuse to commit to the csce" and not allow the Soviet union to take western participation in the csce for granted. During csce, the United Kingdom has always insisted on the outcome of the previous stage of negotiations as a condition for further progress. The western alliance has also taken this basic position.
The csce agenda includes the "security dimension" and "cooperation dimension" of Europe, and there are many topics on the agenda. Therefore, how to make the negotiations proceed smoothly and gain advantages in the negotiations is an issue that both eastern and western camps attach great importance to. The organizational structure of the csce has two implications. One is the format of the conference - whether it is staged or composed of small meetings; Second, the organization of the conference - what kind of consultation bodies should be set up during the negotiations and how many should be set up.
At the NATO Lisbon meeting of 3-4 June 1971, the NATO countries presented two views on the structure of the formal meeting: the first view advocated the formation of csce with multiple meetings, which Italy supported; The second idea calls for a conference, but in stages, an idea that was put forward by France. In the end, the French view prevailed, and the west finally decided that the csce would be held in three stages. On the eve of the multilateral preparatory talks in November 1972, the Soviet union also advocated a three-stage csce and put forward its own agenda. Britain has prepared and revised a document for the ec, defining the basic organizational structure of the csce to establish a cooperation committee and three committees. During the multilateral preparatory meetings, the west and the Soviet union put forward structural ideas for a formal meeting of the csce.
With regard to the organizational structure of the csce, the most important question is not whether there are three stages, but what organizations should be established during the formal negotiations and what their respective responsibilities are. On this issue, the UK insists that a "sufficient number" of committees and sub-committees be established and their terms of reference defined in accordance with csce security, cooperation and other topics. Britain wants to maintain the complexity of the csce organization structure and ensure the meticulous nature of the negotiations. According to the "western organization department" in Britain, western interests can be realized through a rather complicated committee and sub-committee structure. If not, it will be difficult for western interests to be effectively realized in Helsinki, where the size of western missions is limited and the convenience of meetings is restricted. On 13 November 1972, the British foreign and commonwealth office, in an annex to its guidance brief to its preparatory talks delegation, proposed the establishment of three csce committees for the second phase, each dealing with: security; Economic, scientific and technological cooperation; Cultural cooperation, developing humanitarian contacts and expanding the dissemination of information. The first committee consists of two sub-committees and the third committee of four sub-committees. The participants had largely agreed to the idea of a commission, but Britain reckoned that the Soviet union might object because it wanted to limit the duration of the second session to avoid detailed consultations on various issues. Britain, on the other hand, believes that the establishment of committees and sub-committees is the most basic work, which should be solved in multilateral preparatory talks and can provide a basis for future negotiations.
In mid-july 1973, before the formal csce negotiations began, the nine European Community countries asked the UK to revise the document on the organizational structure of the csce and what should be done by the nine countries. Britain's document number is no. 44, which eventually became the common document of the European Community, and Britain's proposition became the common position of the European Community. The paper, based on the multilateral preparatory talks, Final Suggestions, provides detailed answers to the following questions: number of committees; Which committee starts work first; the number of sub-committees and the timing of their commencement; How the work of the sub-committees should be organized; How the committee supervises the work of the sub-committees; How the cooperation committee coordinates the work of each committee. In the UK's view, the Helsinki "final proposal" clearly provides for the establishment of three substantive committees and a cooperation committee, which conforms to the views of the European Community and will not cause difficulties among other participating countries. The United Kingdom contends that the main function of the Coordinating Committee is to coordinate the work of the substantive committees and to maintain continuity of work through meetings; however, the cooperation Committee should not meet too often to avoid putting pressure on the committees; Nor should it require periodic reports from committees. The fco also felt that if the co-operation committee met regularly, it might give the russians a place to "put pressure on to speed up meetings". As for the "substantive committee", Britain argues that the three committees should work simultaneously. As for the sub-committees, Britain envisages them as places where all the proposals can be discussed in detail, so as to ensure that issues that are important to the west are not ignored. Britain insisted that the sub-committees should deal first with substantive issues and that the sum of their discussions constituted the results of the committee's work. Britain believes that this approach has been accepted by the Soviet union and eastern European countries at the csce multilateral preparatory talks, and should not be abandoned by the west during the second phase of the conference.
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Austria formed an early alliance and made proposals for the organizational structure of the csce phase ii, but they did not succeed, in large part because they did not consult the western countries. In addition, small European countries demanded a reduction in the number of sub-committees, but this was resisted by Britain's foreign secretary, Douglas home.
With the establishment of the commission, the question followed: how to define the terms of reference of each committee and its sub-committees. Britain argues that the terms of reference of committees and sub-committees must be clearly defined. Britain attaches great importance to this issue, because it is the only way to better deal with the details of the issue, or when the formal negotiations start, the delegates may not know what to do. Britain wanted to ensure that western representatives could raise their concerns freely and without hindrance at the conference, thus guaranteeing the interests of the western alliance. T.A.K. OTT, British ambassador to Helsinki and head of the British csce delegation, said that Britain "should be able to guarantee a real csce second phase". In order to obtain a clear "terms of reference", Britain also insisted on linking the issue to the determination of the csce agenda and holding discussions at the same time, so as to force the Soviet union to compromise on the "terms of reference" while seeking a favorable agenda. The western alliance accepted the proposal to discuss both issues at the same time. By the time the csce preparatory talks began their second session, the csce agenda and the committee's terms of reference had been developed by the davionix and NATO and presented to the preparatory conference by Belgium, Italy and Denmark on behalf of the west. The delegations of neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe generally welcomed the western proposals and supplemented their deeper views, particularly in the field of security. In fact, consultations on the "terms of reference" covered the early stages of the multilateral preparatory talks and formal meetings of csce. Prior to the multilateral preparatory talks, the nine eec countries had agreed that the preparatory talks stage should be about the terms of reference of the consultative committee and sub-committees. It was written in French documents. The soviets were reluctant to define the terms of reference. The Soviet union initially did not raise the issue of "terms of reference" at all. It did not want to delegate to the committees and resisted. But in the latter stages of the preparatory talks, the Soviet union and eastern European countries "moved towards the west" on issues that suggested they were prepared to accept the terms of reference of the three main committees.
Setting up enough committees, maintaining the complexity of the csce organizational structure, and clarifying the terms of reference of each committee and its sub-committees are all negotiating strategies that Britain insists on. Fundamentally, the British aim is to ensure that western representatives are free to raise issues of interest to the csce that might embarrass the Soviet union, in order to ultimately safeguard the interests of the western alliance. Especially when the "terms of reference" of the committees had been largely defined, Britain felt encouraged that, for example, a political "declaration of principles" could be drawn up if the west tried to work out a set of principles for relations between European states. And, more importantly, the British can efforts to improve the Soviet union in negotiations "humanitarian" and "information" and the more the behavior of the free flow of issues, and the Soviet union insisted that only adopt the way of bilateral consultations, but after determine the scope of their functions and powers, Britain now have to the Soviet union and its Allies to exert pressure "multilateral" approach, the British had never had this kind of power. Elliott said, at least in the UK can now forcing the Soviet union or in the field of "humanitarian" do something tangible improvement -- even if the progress is very small, or with the actual results to show the Soviet union publicly acknowledged that "moderate" desires is how empty "humanitarian space" is what the British want to use for the concept of "fulfilling" Soviet detente. According to the csce results, the Soviet leaders paid a great price for the successful convening of the csce and for multilateral recognition of the "status quo in Europe" after the second world war, especially in terms of humanitarian contacts and information exchanges, and were forced to revise their own concept of "detrension".
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