下面为大家整理一篇优秀的essay代写范文- American food aid policy,供大家参考学习,这篇论文讨论了美国的粮食援助政策。美国的粮食援助是由六个具有不同类别、功能和政策目标的粮食援助计划组成,这些计划由美国农业部和美国国际开发援助署分别进行管理。480公法是美国粮食援助的主要组成部分,其项下的480公法第二章是目前美国最大的粮食援助计划,占美国粮食援助的比重超过了70%。
Food aid falls into different categories and modalities. On the one hand, food aid is classified into emergency and non-emergency assistance by category. Emergency food aid, in the form of donations, is used to cope with natural and man-made emergencies, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and wars. Non-emergency food aid aims at solving the hunger and food security problems that have long plagued poor countries. Each year, there is a relatively fixed number of aid recipients and a stable amount of aid. Different from the free donation of emergency aid, some non-emergency food aid is monetized for sale in the local distribution of aid recipients, i.e., Monetization of food aid. On the other hand, food aid is divided into in-kind aid and cash aid in different ways. The former is for the donor countries to transport their own food to the recipient countries, while the latter is for the donor countries to use cash to directly purchase food in the recipient countries or surrounding areas. As the world's largest food donor, the United States has always given priority to food aid in kind. In 2007, the proportion of food aid in kind in the United States reached 99.3% of its total aid, which is obviously different from cash aid donors like the European Union.
The United States has many problems with its food aid in kind. First, because food aid in kind in the United States needs to be transported over long distances to reach recipient countries, food aid in kind must bear high transportation costs. According to a 2007 report by the office for government accountability in the United States, rising commercial and transportation costs have led to a 43 percent reduction in the amount of food aid delivered. In the main food aid program, public law 480, chapter 2, commercial and transportation costs have reached 65 percent of the total cost. In addition, the U.S. government requires that 75% of the total food aid must be shipped by U.S. shipping companies, which increases the cost of food transportation due to lack of competition. Second, food aid in kind lacks flexibility in responding to emergency food aid. Grain stored in U.S. farm warehouses, processed, packaged, and transported domestically and overseas, often takes four to six months to arrive. With the increasing frequency of natural disasters in the world in recent years, some poor countries in sub-saharan Africa and Asia have gradually increased their demand for emergency food aid. However, such a slow pace of food aid in the United States may miss the best opportunity for aid, which greatly reduces the actual effect of emergency food aid. Not only that, food aid that misses the best opportunity is likely to impact or disrupt the local food market of the recipient country. The food delivered after the recipient country recovers from the crisis will lead to a sharp drop in food prices in the local market, which will have an impact on the country's agriculture and food production. Third, the monetization of food aid in kind by the United States not only distorts international trade in food, but also disturbs the markets of recipient countries. In fact, a considerable proportion of the in-kind assistance of the United States, including the food for progress and the food for education program, is sold at preferential prices in recipient countries. This monetization of food aid has been widely questioned. On the one hand, the preferential sales of food aid will undoubtedly replace the commodity grain imports of recipient countries, and food aid will become disguised food export subsidy, which will definitely distort the normal commodity grain trade. Therefore, the monetization of food aid of the United States is strongly opposed by the major food aid donors and exporters led by the European Union, and it is also in conflict with the agricultural trade rules of the WTO. On the other hand, the local sale of food in recipient countries will also impact the agriculture and food production of recipient countries, making the already deteriorating food security situation in recipient countries more severe.
In a word, at present, the food aid of the United States is confronted with numerous problems. Under the situation of increasing demand for emergency food aid, the food aid mainly in kind is even less effective. Therefore, all relevant groups in the United States and other countries involved in international food aid have called on the United States government to increase the proportion of cash purchases of food around the recipient countries. The United States government has also deeply realized the necessity of food aid policy reform. During the solicitation of opinions on the farm act of 2008, the bush administration proposed that 25% of the program funds in chapter ii of public law 480 should be used as cash aid to purchase food locally or in surrounding areas in recipient countries, so as to improve the efficiency of food aid in kind.
Unlike previous farm bills, President George w. bush vetoed the new farm bill because he was dissatisfied with its content. But the veto was quickly voted down by congress, giving the $307 billion food, protection and energy bill final congressional authority and passage into law. Food aid remains a major trade issue in the new farm bill. Whether the new bill can make the desired adjustments to the food aid policy, or merely make superficial changes to the provisions of the minor provisions, requires an evaluation of the relevant provisions of the food aid policy in the bill.
The farm bill's new provisions come as a disappointment to a broad range of concerns about the transition of food aid from in-kind to cash. The bill makes no changes to the form of aid provided under chapter 2 of the 480 public law. It is clear that the government's proposal to allocate cash aid has not been adopted, which means that the food aid program will maintain its existing form of aid in kind. Even though the bill was added as an experimental plan for $60 million, total cost of the set in different years, different amount of cash, cash to assess the effect of food aid, but relative to the total of $2 billion in food aid, the experimental plan accounted for only 3%, the effect of aid may be difficult to assess due to was not significant. , on the other hand, due to the effect of cash assistance in other countries have been demonstrated in the process, especially in the process of emergency food aid, cash has basically been recognized to be one of the most efficient way of aid, and therefore does not seem to be set up the necessity of experimental plan, set up the project can be regarded as delay "road" of the reform of in-kind food aid.
The farm bill also sets out new rules to address the long lead times for the delivery of food aid in the United States. Moving food from U.S. farms to markets in recipient countries requires a number of intermediate steps that, if not properly connected, can extend the time it takes to reach its destination. To speed up the operational cycle of food aid by making it easier to prepare, store, transport and deliver packaged food, the new bill would raise the ceiling on the budget for intermediate steps from $3m a year to $8m. In addition, to shorten the delivery cycle of food aid, the United States has established a number of pre-storage sites, or site-specific storage sites, at home and abroad to speed up the response to emergency food aid. The bill would raise the budget ceiling for targeted foreign storage of food aid from $2 million to $10 million and allow the funds to be used to assess and establish new storage sites. These provisions are only changes under the original framework of food aid, namely, to increase the budget of funds to improve the flexibility and response speed of food aid to emergencies on the premise of ensuring food aid in kind. Obviously, these new policies and regulations increase the government's financial expenditure, but do not increase the amount of food aid, only increase the budget in exchange for reducing the response time of food aid, which will inevitably lead to more waste of food aid funds.
All in all, the 2008 farm bill did not adopt the bush administration's $300 million in funding for cash aid, but established a $60 million gross experimental local procurement plans, in response to the dissatisfaction with food aid to the low efficiency, but the necessity of to set up the experimental plan and may be difficult to assess the effect of; We increased financial support for the intermediate links of in-kind aid, strengthened in-kind food aid, and increased the waste of funds while improving the time efficiency of in-kind aid. Overall, these new rules did not make substantive changes in food aid policy, also did not fundamentally change the status quo of the United States is given priority to with real food aid, but it doesn't matter in some aspect of the article made some surface, in fact is to strengthen the support for in-kind food aid, the U.S. food aid problems such as high cost, low efficiency, and monetization is still there.
Despite the high cost and low efficiency of food aid in the United States, the farm act of 2008 failed to fundamentally solve the problem, indicating that there is considerable resistance to the adjustment of food aid policies. The main reason is the influence of various interest groups in the food aid of the United States on the policy making. The interests closely related to food aid in the United States mainly include farmers, transportation sectors, transnational food trading companies and private voluntary organizations. These interest groups strongly oppose any possible policy adjustment of food aid in order to protect their vested interests in food aid in kind.
American agriculture has been subsidized by the government for a long time. The problem of overproduction of agricultural products, especially bulk food products, has been troubling the American government and farmers for a long time. Under the premise that the oversupply of agricultural products in the domestic market cannot be changed, the government has set its target on the foreign market, hoping to solve the problem of overproduction by exporting agricultural products. It is against this background that food aid entered the stage of history. Although assistance under section 416 is currently very low, food aid, supported by financial support from the government, has a clear role in subsidising food exports by sending food abroad. Food aid can also be seen as a disguised export subsidy policy implemented by the United States under the pretext of humanitarian aid. As a result, food aid has been supported by food producers in the United States. The United States wheat association opposes purchases in areas around recipient countries that are not in emergency assistance and supports appropriate monetization of food aid. American farmers are one of the interest groups blocking food aid reform.
The United States government requires that no less than 75 percent of food aid be shipped through its own shipping companies, providing a steady source of business for the transportation sector. In recent years, about us $1 billion has been spent on food aid in the United States to cover transportation costs, accounting for about half of the total budget. It can be seen that the transportation sector plays an important role in the interest chain of food aid. If food aid in kind were reformed and part of it spent on local procurement in recipient countries, it would inevitably reduce the volume of food transport and thus reduce the benefits of the transport sector, which was unacceptable. No wonder, then, that the transport sector is the strongest opponent of cash for food aid. The farm act of 2008, which added transportation representatives to the food aid advisory group, will strengthen its role as a deterrent to food aid reform.
Multinational food trading companies and private voluntary organizations involved in the distribution of food aid are also supporters of food aid in kind. Transnational grain trading companies dominate the world's grain trade, and can be seen from the processing, packaging, transportation and other links of grain. Food aid in kind is supported by stable financial funds provided by the us government, providing a stable source of business for food transnational corporations. Private voluntary organizations achieve their humanitarian relief goals by applying for food aid from government agencies and then offering partial preferential sales of food aid locally in recipient countries. Because these private voluntary organizations have become dependent on U.S. food aid, they are also supporters of U.S. food aid in kind. If the U.S. government gives food aid directly in cash, these organizations lose their main source of income and are unable to achieve their aid goals, which they do not want.
Interest groups play an important role in the formulation of the food aid policy of the United States. As long as the policy reform may harm their interests, these interest groups will lobby the members of congress to vote against the reform proposals of the government and research institutions and hinder the reform process of the food aid policy. As long as these interest groups exist and have a voice in congressional decision-making, it will be difficult to adjust U.S. food aid policies. Although the WTO and the European Union have been urging the reform of food aid to the United States, they are unable to shake the dominant position of various interest groups in the food aid of the United States and make fundamental changes in the food aid policy of the United States due to their lack of coercive force. As a result, U.S. food aid in kind will continue.
In conclusion, although the United States is given priority to with real food aid inefficiency, lack of flexibility in the process of emergency food aid, but because of the powerful interests against the reform in the process of policy making, the 2008 farm act does not make substantive changes in food aid policy, the U.S. food aid to such problems as high cost, low efficiency, and monetization is still there. U.S. food aid didn't really have to solve the food security problem in developing countries for a long time, the biggest beneficiary is America's farmers, international food trade company and different interest groups, such as transportation department these interests to share most of the food aid interests chain, and as the development of food aid recipient countries have been the only American interest groups to aid policy game a by-product of success. If food aid of the United States is to get back on track and solve the current problems of high cost and inefficiency, it must weaken the influence of interest groups on aid policies and make food aid truly become a humanitarian aid operation serving developing countries.
Since 2005, China has transformed itself from a recipient of food aid to a donor of food aid, playing an increasingly important role in international aid affairs. As a country with a large population in the world, ensuring domestic food security has always been the most important food policy objective of the Chinese government. Although China is not yet able to become an important food aid donor country in the world like the United States, food aid can not only alleviate the current situation of world hunger and maintain world food security, improve China's international status, but also help enhance the political and economic relations between China and the recipient countries and maintain regional peace and stability. Therefore, within the scope of government financial funds, China still has the necessity of carrying out foreign food aid. In the process of implementing food aid, China should adopt different forms of aid according to different situations of donor countries. On the one hand, the ocean the other shore of sub-saharan African countries, should be given priority to with food aid in the form of cash, such as the southern African countries to China in December 2008 of lesotho food aid, is through the world food programme donate $1 million in cash, in the recipient countries local purchase 1336 tons of corn flour for rescue, had a very good effects and international aid; On the other hand, food aid to countries with food crisis around China should be mainly in kind. For example, food aid to the DPRK, myanmar and other countries timely alleviates the hunger situation in these countries and effectively implements humanitarian emergency food aid.
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Food aid falls into different categories and modalities. On the one hand, food aid is classified into emergency and non-emergency assistance by category. Emergency food aid, in the form of donations, is used to cope with natural and man-made emergencies, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and wars. Non-emergency food aid aims at solving the hunger and food security problems that have long plagued poor countries. Each year, there is a relatively fixed number of aid recipients and a stable amount of aid. Different from the free donation of emergency aid, some non-emergency food aid is monetized for sale in the local distribution of aid recipients, i.e., Monetization of food aid. On the other hand, food aid is divided into in-kind aid and cash aid in different ways. The former is for the donor countries to transport their own food to the recipient countries, while the latter is for the donor countries to use cash to directly purchase food in the recipient countries or surrounding areas. As the world's largest food donor, the United States has always given priority to food aid in kind. In 2007, the proportion of food aid in kind in the United States reached 99.3% of its total aid, which is obviously different from cash aid donors like the European Union.
The United States has many problems with its food aid in kind. First, because food aid in kind in the United States needs to be transported over long distances to reach recipient countries, food aid in kind must bear high transportation costs. According to a 2007 report by the office for government accountability in the United States, rising commercial and transportation costs have led to a 43 percent reduction in the amount of food aid delivered. In the main food aid program, public law 480, chapter 2, commercial and transportation costs have reached 65 percent of the total cost. In addition, the U.S. government requires that 75% of the total food aid must be shipped by U.S. shipping companies, which increases the cost of food transportation due to lack of competition. Second, food aid in kind lacks flexibility in responding to emergency food aid. Grain stored in U.S. farm warehouses, processed, packaged, and transported domestically and overseas, often takes four to six months to arrive. With the increasing frequency of natural disasters in the world in recent years, some poor countries in sub-saharan Africa and Asia have gradually increased their demand for emergency food aid. However, such a slow pace of food aid in the United States may miss the best opportunity for aid, which greatly reduces the actual effect of emergency food aid. Not only that, food aid that misses the best opportunity is likely to impact or disrupt the local food market of the recipient country. The food delivered after the recipient country recovers from the crisis will lead to a sharp drop in food prices in the local market, which will have an impact on the country's agriculture and food production. Third, the monetization of food aid in kind by the United States not only distorts international trade in food, but also disturbs the markets of recipient countries. In fact, a considerable proportion of the in-kind assistance of the United States, including the food for progress and the food for education program, is sold at preferential prices in recipient countries. This monetization of food aid has been widely questioned. On the one hand, the preferential sales of food aid will undoubtedly replace the commodity grain imports of recipient countries, and food aid will become disguised food export subsidy, which will definitely distort the normal commodity grain trade. Therefore, the monetization of food aid of the United States is strongly opposed by the major food aid donors and exporters led by the European Union, and it is also in conflict with the agricultural trade rules of the WTO. On the other hand, the local sale of food in recipient countries will also impact the agriculture and food production of recipient countries, making the already deteriorating food security situation in recipient countries more severe.
In a word, at present, the food aid of the United States is confronted with numerous problems. Under the situation of increasing demand for emergency food aid, the food aid mainly in kind is even less effective. Therefore, all relevant groups in the United States and other countries involved in international food aid have called on the United States government to increase the proportion of cash purchases of food around the recipient countries. The United States government has also deeply realized the necessity of food aid policy reform. During the solicitation of opinions on the farm act of 2008, the bush administration proposed that 25% of the program funds in chapter ii of public law 480 should be used as cash aid to purchase food locally or in surrounding areas in recipient countries, so as to improve the efficiency of food aid in kind.
Unlike previous farm bills, President George w. bush vetoed the new farm bill because he was dissatisfied with its content. But the veto was quickly voted down by congress, giving the $307 billion food, protection and energy bill final congressional authority and passage into law. Food aid remains a major trade issue in the new farm bill. Whether the new bill can make the desired adjustments to the food aid policy, or merely make superficial changes to the provisions of the minor provisions, requires an evaluation of the relevant provisions of the food aid policy in the bill.
The farm bill's new provisions come as a disappointment to a broad range of concerns about the transition of food aid from in-kind to cash. The bill makes no changes to the form of aid provided under chapter 2 of the 480 public law. It is clear that the government's proposal to allocate cash aid has not been adopted, which means that the food aid program will maintain its existing form of aid in kind. Even though the bill was added as an experimental plan for $60 million, total cost of the set in different years, different amount of cash, cash to assess the effect of food aid, but relative to the total of $2 billion in food aid, the experimental plan accounted for only 3%, the effect of aid may be difficult to assess due to was not significant. , on the other hand, due to the effect of cash assistance in other countries have been demonstrated in the process, especially in the process of emergency food aid, cash has basically been recognized to be one of the most efficient way of aid, and therefore does not seem to be set up the necessity of experimental plan, set up the project can be regarded as delay "road" of the reform of in-kind food aid.
The farm bill also sets out new rules to address the long lead times for the delivery of food aid in the United States. Moving food from U.S. farms to markets in recipient countries requires a number of intermediate steps that, if not properly connected, can extend the time it takes to reach its destination. To speed up the operational cycle of food aid by making it easier to prepare, store, transport and deliver packaged food, the new bill would raise the ceiling on the budget for intermediate steps from $3m a year to $8m. In addition, to shorten the delivery cycle of food aid, the United States has established a number of pre-storage sites, or site-specific storage sites, at home and abroad to speed up the response to emergency food aid. The bill would raise the budget ceiling for targeted foreign storage of food aid from $2 million to $10 million and allow the funds to be used to assess and establish new storage sites. These provisions are only changes under the original framework of food aid, namely, to increase the budget of funds to improve the flexibility and response speed of food aid to emergencies on the premise of ensuring food aid in kind. Obviously, these new policies and regulations increase the government's financial expenditure, but do not increase the amount of food aid, only increase the budget in exchange for reducing the response time of food aid, which will inevitably lead to more waste of food aid funds.
All in all, the 2008 farm bill did not adopt the bush administration's $300 million in funding for cash aid, but established a $60 million gross experimental local procurement plans, in response to the dissatisfaction with food aid to the low efficiency, but the necessity of to set up the experimental plan and may be difficult to assess the effect of; We increased financial support for the intermediate links of in-kind aid, strengthened in-kind food aid, and increased the waste of funds while improving the time efficiency of in-kind aid. Overall, these new rules did not make substantive changes in food aid policy, also did not fundamentally change the status quo of the United States is given priority to with real food aid, but it doesn't matter in some aspect of the article made some surface, in fact is to strengthen the support for in-kind food aid, the U.S. food aid problems such as high cost, low efficiency, and monetization is still there.
Despite the high cost and low efficiency of food aid in the United States, the farm act of 2008 failed to fundamentally solve the problem, indicating that there is considerable resistance to the adjustment of food aid policies. The main reason is the influence of various interest groups in the food aid of the United States on the policy making. The interests closely related to food aid in the United States mainly include farmers, transportation sectors, transnational food trading companies and private voluntary organizations. These interest groups strongly oppose any possible policy adjustment of food aid in order to protect their vested interests in food aid in kind.
American agriculture has been subsidized by the government for a long time. The problem of overproduction of agricultural products, especially bulk food products, has been troubling the American government and farmers for a long time. Under the premise that the oversupply of agricultural products in the domestic market cannot be changed, the government has set its target on the foreign market, hoping to solve the problem of overproduction by exporting agricultural products. It is against this background that food aid entered the stage of history. Although assistance under section 416 is currently very low, food aid, supported by financial support from the government, has a clear role in subsidising food exports by sending food abroad. Food aid can also be seen as a disguised export subsidy policy implemented by the United States under the pretext of humanitarian aid. As a result, food aid has been supported by food producers in the United States. The United States wheat association opposes purchases in areas around recipient countries that are not in emergency assistance and supports appropriate monetization of food aid. American farmers are one of the interest groups blocking food aid reform.
The United States government requires that no less than 75 percent of food aid be shipped through its own shipping companies, providing a steady source of business for the transportation sector. In recent years, about us $1 billion has been spent on food aid in the United States to cover transportation costs, accounting for about half of the total budget. It can be seen that the transportation sector plays an important role in the interest chain of food aid. If food aid in kind were reformed and part of it spent on local procurement in recipient countries, it would inevitably reduce the volume of food transport and thus reduce the benefits of the transport sector, which was unacceptable. No wonder, then, that the transport sector is the strongest opponent of cash for food aid. The farm act of 2008, which added transportation representatives to the food aid advisory group, will strengthen its role as a deterrent to food aid reform.
Multinational food trading companies and private voluntary organizations involved in the distribution of food aid are also supporters of food aid in kind. Transnational grain trading companies dominate the world's grain trade, and can be seen from the processing, packaging, transportation and other links of grain. Food aid in kind is supported by stable financial funds provided by the us government, providing a stable source of business for food transnational corporations. Private voluntary organizations achieve their humanitarian relief goals by applying for food aid from government agencies and then offering partial preferential sales of food aid locally in recipient countries. Because these private voluntary organizations have become dependent on U.S. food aid, they are also supporters of U.S. food aid in kind. If the U.S. government gives food aid directly in cash, these organizations lose their main source of income and are unable to achieve their aid goals, which they do not want.
Interest groups play an important role in the formulation of the food aid policy of the United States. As long as the policy reform may harm their interests, these interest groups will lobby the members of congress to vote against the reform proposals of the government and research institutions and hinder the reform process of the food aid policy. As long as these interest groups exist and have a voice in congressional decision-making, it will be difficult to adjust U.S. food aid policies. Although the WTO and the European Union have been urging the reform of food aid to the United States, they are unable to shake the dominant position of various interest groups in the food aid of the United States and make fundamental changes in the food aid policy of the United States due to their lack of coercive force. As a result, U.S. food aid in kind will continue.
In conclusion, although the United States is given priority to with real food aid inefficiency, lack of flexibility in the process of emergency food aid, but because of the powerful interests against the reform in the process of policy making, the 2008 farm act does not make substantive changes in food aid policy, the U.S. food aid to such problems as high cost, low efficiency, and monetization is still there. U.S. food aid didn't really have to solve the food security problem in developing countries for a long time, the biggest beneficiary is America's farmers, international food trade company and different interest groups, such as transportation department these interests to share most of the food aid interests chain, and as the development of food aid recipient countries have been the only American interest groups to aid policy game a by-product of success. If food aid of the United States is to get back on track and solve the current problems of high cost and inefficiency, it must weaken the influence of interest groups on aid policies and make food aid truly become a humanitarian aid operation serving developing countries.
Since 2005, China has transformed itself from a recipient of food aid to a donor of food aid, playing an increasingly important role in international aid affairs. As a country with a large population in the world, ensuring domestic food security has always been the most important food policy objective of the Chinese government. Although China is not yet able to become an important food aid donor country in the world like the United States, food aid can not only alleviate the current situation of world hunger and maintain world food security, improve China's international status, but also help enhance the political and economic relations between China and the recipient countries and maintain regional peace and stability. Therefore, within the scope of government financial funds, China still has the necessity of carrying out foreign food aid. In the process of implementing food aid, China should adopt different forms of aid according to different situations of donor countries. On the one hand, the ocean the other shore of sub-saharan African countries, should be given priority to with food aid in the form of cash, such as the southern African countries to China in December 2008 of lesotho food aid, is through the world food programme donate $1 million in cash, in the recipient countries local purchase 1336 tons of corn flour for rescue, had a very good effects and international aid; On the other hand, food aid to countries with food crisis around China should be mainly in kind. For example, food aid to the DPRK, myanmar and other countries timely alleviates the hunger situation in these countries and effectively implements humanitarian emergency food aid.
51due留学教育原创版权郑重声明:原创essay代写范文源自编辑创作,未经官方许可,网站谢绝转载。对于侵权行为,未经同意的情况下,51Due有权追究法律责任。主要业务有essay代写、assignment代写、paper代写、作业代写服务。
51due为留学生提供最好的essay代写服务,亲们可以进入主页了解和获取更多essay代写范文 提供代写服务,详情可以咨询我们的客服QQ:800020041。