私たちの国は、南北戦争を引き起こした分裂に匹敵するとまではいかないまでも、混乱、不確実性、不統一の状態にあります。
我々国民は、長年にわたって満足し、連邦政府にほとんど盲目的に導かれてきた結果、ワシントンD.C.と多くの州政府関係者が、建国の父が我々国民に与えられたと認めた権力を簒奪することを許してしまいました。
私たちが再び憲法に従うように、国の支配権を取り戻す計画はあるのでしょうか？ある人は「ある」と言い、ある人は「ない」と言います。もし計画があるとしたら、誰もそれを敵に明かそうとはしないのではないでしょうか。もし計画がないと言う人がいたら、その主張する事実が真実であるとどうして分かるのかと問いたい。
私はトランプ大統領に忠誠を誓っており、間違いが証明されない限り、その忠誠心を維持し続けるつもりです。私は、トランプ大統領が中国共産党やグローバリスト、ディープステートに国の鍵を渡したとは思っていません。トランプ氏は愛国者であると信じている。ですから、私は忍耐を求め続けます。
その間に、愛国者たちは自分たちの地方政府を取り戻すことを始め、その基盤をもとに州政府の支配権を取り戻すことを強く求めます。自分が住んでいる場所に最も近い政府機関が、常に自分の意見に最も反応してくれるはずです。
ワクチンを打つかどうかを決めるのと同じです。自分で客観的な調査をして、それから自分の医療機関に相談する。連邦政府の「専門家」の勧告に盲目的に従うのではなく、十分な情報を得た上で自分自身で決断してください。
あなたの個人的な自由の上に立ち、政府関係者に、私たちの国の自由を破壊するのではなく、認めるように要求しましょう。
われら合衆国国民は、より完全な連邦を形成し、正義を確立し、国内の平穏を確保し、共同防衛を行い、一般の福祉を増進し、われら自身及びわれらの子孫に自由のもたらす恵沢を確保するため、合衆国憲法を制定する。

前文は、グーバニューア・モリスが中心となって最終草案を作成した文体委員会によって、憲法会議の最後の日に憲法に盛り込まれた。 この前文は、事前に大会の議場で提案されたり議論されたりしたものではない。 前文の最初の文言は、合衆国国民に言及しておらず、むしろ各州の国民に言及していた。
1778年のフランスとの同盟条約、連合規約、アメリカの独立を承認した1783年のパリ条約など、それ以前の文書では、「国民」という言葉は使われておらず、合衆国という文言の直後に、北から南へと州が列挙されていた[1]。憲法は、9つの州の民選による批准大会が承認したときはいつでも、残りの州が批准したかどうかにかかわらず、その9つの州に対して発効すると規定していたため、この変更は必要に迫られて行われた[2]。
前文は単に序文としての役割を果たし、連邦政府に権限を付与するものではなく[3]、政府の行動に対する具体的な制限を規定するものでもない。 前文が限定的なものであるため、軽薄な訴訟に関するものを除いては、どの裁判所も判決における決定的な要素として前文を使用したことはない[4]。
司法との関連性
裁判所は、憲法の意味に関して前文に見出すことができるあらゆる手がかりに関心を示している[6]。裁判所は、法令の意味を解釈するためのいくつかの技法を開発しており、これらは憲法の解釈にも用いられている[7]。その結果、裁判所は、憲法の意味を解釈する際には、文書の正確な文言[8]に焦点を当てる解釈技法を用いるべきであると述べている。 このような技法に対してバランスをとるのが、文言以上のものから文書の意味を見極めようとする、より広範な努力に注目する技法である。[9]前文は、憲法の「精神」を見極めようとするこのような努力にも有用である。
加えて、法律文書を解釈する際、裁判所は通常、その文書をその作成者がどのように理解し、どのような動機で作成したのかに関心を持つ[10]。その結果、裁判所は、建国者が理解した憲法の歴史、意図、意味の証拠として前文を引用してきた。[11]ある意味では革命的ではあるが、憲法は多くの慣習法の概念（人身保護、陪審裁判、主権免除など）を維持しており[12]、裁判所は、憲法が生み出した法制度に対する創設者たちの認識（すなわち、憲法が変えたものと変えたものとの相互作用、 裁判所は、憲法の意味を決定する最終的な権限を自らに留保するものの、憲法制定会議において憲法を討議し起草した人々の理解の証拠とともに、政府高官、特に初期の政府高官が憲法の規定をどのように実践してきたかにも関心を抱いている[15]。[16]しかし、憲法の歴史的理解に焦点を当てることは、憲法を起草した18世紀末の社会から変化した現代社会の状況と緊張関係にあることがある。[17]憲法の背後にある政治理論に関するこれらの考察はすべて、最高裁判所に憲法解釈のための様々な特別な規則や原則を明示するよう促している[18]。例えば、憲法の背後にある目的に対する裁判所のレンダリングは、個人の自由に関する広範な解釈を好むことを表明させた[19]。
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• McDonald, Forrest. "Essay on the Preamble". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved July 13,2014.
• Schütze, Robert. European Constitutional Law, p. 50 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
• See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) ("Although th[e] preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States, or on any of its departments."); see also United States v. Boyer, 85 F. 425, 430–31 (W.D. Mo. 1898) ("The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se. It can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them." (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 462 (1833)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
• It is difficult to prove a negative, but courts have at times acknowledged this apparent truism. See, e.g., Boyer, 85 F. at 430 ("I venture the opinion that no adjudicated case can be cited which traces to the preamble the power to enact any statute.").
• In Jacobs v. Pataki, 68 F. App'x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2003), the plaintiff made the bizarre argument that "the 'United States of America' that was granted Article III power in the Constitution is distinct from the 'United States' that currently exercises that power"; the court dismissed this contention with 3 words ("it is not") and cited a comparison of the Preamble's reference to the "United States of America" with Article III's vesting of the "judicial Power of the United States."
• Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531–32 (1871) ("[I]t [cannot] be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers, conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which those powers were granted. This is a universal rule of construction applied alike to statutes, wills, contracts, and constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the language of its provisions must be construed with reference to that purpose and so as to subserve it. In no other way can the intent of the framers of the instrument be discovered. And there are more urgent reasons for looking to the ultimate purpose in examining the powers conferred by a constitution than there are in construing a statute, a will, or a contract. We do not expect to find in a constitution minute details. It is necessarily brief and comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving the filling up to be deduced from the outlines."), abrogated on other grounds by Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as recognized in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
• Cf. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1937) ("Rules applicable to the construction of a statute are equally applicable to the construction of a Constitution." (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 (1865))).
• Examples include the "plain meaning rule," Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 619 (1895) ("The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction."), superseded on other grounds by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, as recognized in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) ("The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text ...."), and noscitur a sociis, Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) ("It is a familiar rule in the construction of terms to apply to them the meaning naturally attaching to them from their context. Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments. Where any particular word is obscure or of doubtful meaning, taken by itself, its obscurity or doubt may be removed by reference to associated words. And the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.").
• See, e.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 663 (1945) ("[I]n determining the meaning and application of [a] constitutional provision, we are concerned with matters of substance, not of form."), overruled on other grounds by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905) ("[I]t is undoubtedly true that that which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed."), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) ("[I]n construing the Constitution of the United States, [courts use] the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers ...."); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 87 (1877) ("A mere adherence to the letter [of the Constitution], without reference to the spirit and purpose, may [sometimes] mislead.").
• Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 219 (1901) ("[W]hen called upon to construe and apply a provision of the Constitution of the United States, [courts] must look not merely to its language but to its historical origin, and to those decisions of this court in which its meaning and the scope of its operation have received deliberate consideration.").
• United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944) ("Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they had in the common parlance of the times in which the Constitution was written."), superseded on other grounds by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006)), as recognized in U.S. Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887) ("[I]n the construction of the language of the Constitution ..., we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985), and United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
• United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 311 (1892) ("[T]he Constitution ... is to be read in the light of the common law, from which our system of jurisprudence is derived." (citations omitted)); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) ("The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.").
• United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 142 (1936) ("Whether a clause in the Constitution is to be restricted by a rule of the common law as it existed when the Constitution was adopted depends upon the terms or nature of the particular clause." (citing Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935))); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new guaranties of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he already possessed as a British subject—such as his ancestors had inherited and defended since the days of Magna Charta.").
• Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 542 (1869) ("We are obliged ... to resort to historical evidence, and to seek the meaning of the words [in the Constitution] in the use and in the opinion of those whose relations to the government, and means of knowledge, warranted them in speaking with authority.").
• McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) ("[W]here there is ambiguity or doubt [in the meaning of constitutional language], or where two views may well be entertained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction are entitled to the greatest weight."); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 279–80 (1856) ("[A] legislative construction of the constitution, commencing so early in the government, when the first occasion for [a] manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was 'due process of law.'" (citations omitted)).
• Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 311 (1901) ("[A] practical construction [of the Constitution] is relied upon only in cases of doubt .... Where there was obviously a matter of doubt, we have yielded assent to the construction placed by those having actual charge of the execution of the statute, but where there was no doubt we have steadfastly declined to recognize any force in practical construction. Thus, before any appeal can be made to practical construction, it must appear that the true meaning is doubtful."); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
• In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591 (1895) ("Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation extends to new matters as the modes of business and the habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation."), overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 31 (1873) ("[T]he Federal Constitution must receive a practical construction. Its limitations and its implied prohibitions must not be extended so far as to destroy the necessary powers of the States, or prevent their efficient exercise."); In re Jackson, 13 F. Cas. 194, 196 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (No. 7124) ("[I]n construing a grant of power in the constitution, it is to be construed according to the fair and reasonable import of its terms, and its construction is not necessarily to be controlled by a reference to what existed when the constitution was adopted.").
• E.g., Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 77, 78 (1946) ("[T]o infer qualifications does not comport with the standards for expounding the Constitution .... We cannot, therefore, read the prohibition against 'any' tax on exports as containing an implied qualification."); Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 287 ("The words expressing the various grants [of power] in the Constitution are words of general import, and they are to be construed as such, and as granting to the full extent the powers named."); Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36, 43 (1889) ("Constitutions ... are construed to operate prospectively only, unless, on the face of the instrument or enactment, the contrary intention is manifest beyond reasonable question.")
• Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."), recognized as abrogated on other grounds in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
