Basically, the same view on social problems is taken by a second prominent textbook in the field: “The first and basic ingredient of a social problem consists of a substantial discrepancy between widely shared social standards and actual conditions of social life” (Merton and Nisbet, 1971:799). It is clear from the author’s development of this point that he regards the “discrepancy” in question as an objective reality, not depending on any collective recognition or public opinion. He claims, in fact, that social scientists can sometimes recognize the discrepancy before the rest of society (Merton and Nisbet, 1971:806-810). To him, public opinion functions primarily to bring about the recognition of problems already there, rather than to generate the problems themselves.
A third established textbook on social problems is highly critical of both texts just described (and of most others in the field) for being “overly relativistic and lacking in intellectual direction” (Skolnick and Currie, 1970:2). The authors of this third book take a forthrightly moralistic stance, arguing that the study of social problems should begin with the study of such basic processes as “institutional decay,” which they (and presumably any alert social critic) should be able to see. To them, there are certain “problematic aspects of American society” which, while often neglected in textbooks, are objectively real and are properly “open…to public scrutiny.” There is a little recognition in this text of moral relativity or of collective definitions as the genesis of social problems (Skolnick and Currie, 1970:14-16).
There are two textbooks which give a much greater recognition to the importance of public opinion processes in the production of social problems, and further reference will be made to them later on (Davis, 1970; and Becker, 1966). Most of the books on social problems, however, fail to utilize Durkheim’s insight. For if it is true, as Durkheim says, that “we do not reprove [an action] because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it,” then it is equally true that we do not deplore a social condition because it is a problem; rather, it is a problem because we deplore it. Such, then, is the first premise guiding the treatment of social problems in this textbook: No social condition, however, deplorable or intolerable it may seem to social scientists or social critics, is inherently problematic. It is made a problem by the entrepreneurship of various interest groups, which succeed in winning over important segments of public opinion to the support of a social movement aimed at changing that condition. Since, therefore, a social problem is dependent on a social movement for its very existence and is, practically speaking, coterminous with it, we might say that a social problem is simply a kind of social movement. This position carries to a logical conclusion the ideas of such theorists as Durkheim, Blumer, and Becker, as well as the perspectives of certain earlier (but generally forgotten) social problems writers like Waller (1936), Fuller and Myers (1937 and 1941), and Cuber, Harper, and Kenkel (1936). Their ideas will be discussed somewhat more fully later on. For now, it is enough to note that the treatment of social problems in this book reverses the causal connection they are usually believed to have with social movements. Whereas most authors assert or imply that social problems generate (ameliorative) social movements, the present author takes the position that social movements generate social problems.
A third established textbook on social problems is highly critical of both texts just described (and of most others in the field) for being “overly relativistic and lacking in intellectual direction” (Skolnick and Currie, 1970:2). The authors of this third book take a forthrightly moralistic stance, arguing that the study of social problems should begin with the study of such basic processes as “institutional decay,” which they (and presumably any alert social critic) should be able to see. To them, there are certain “problematic aspects of American society” which, while often neglected in textbooks, are objectively real and are properly “open…to public scrutiny.” There is a little recognition in this text of moral relativity or of collective definitions as the genesis of social problems (Skolnick and Currie, 1970:14-16).
There are two textbooks which give a much greater recognition to the importance of public opinion processes in the production of social problems, and further reference will be made to them later on (Davis, 1970; and Becker, 1966). Most of the books on social problems, however, fail to utilize Durkheim’s insight. For if it is true, as Durkheim says, that “we do not reprove [an action] because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it,” then it is equally true that we do not deplore a social condition because it is a problem; rather, it is a problem because we deplore it. Such, then, is the first premise guiding the treatment of social problems in this textbook: No social condition, however, deplorable or intolerable it may seem to social scientists or social critics, is inherently problematic. It is made a problem by the entrepreneurship of various interest groups, which succeed in winning over important segments of public opinion to the support of a social movement aimed at changing that condition. Since, therefore, a social problem is dependent on a social movement for its very existence and is, practically speaking, coterminous with it, we might say that a social problem is simply a kind of social movement. This position carries to a logical conclusion the ideas of such theorists as Durkheim, Blumer, and Becker, as well as the perspectives of certain earlier (but generally forgotten) social problems writers like Waller (1936), Fuller and Myers (1937 and 1941), and Cuber, Harper, and Kenkel (1936). Their ideas will be discussed somewhat more fully later on. For now, it is enough to note that the treatment of social problems in this book reverses the causal connection they are usually believed to have with social movements. Whereas most authors assert or imply that social problems generate (ameliorative) social movements, the present author takes the position that social movements generate social problems.
