文明のターンテーブルThe Turntable of Civilization

日本の時間、世界の時間。
The time of Japan, the time of the world

Qual è la ragione per cui non si chiudono gli Istituti Confucio,

2024年10月08日 16時08分54秒 | 全般
Quello che segue è un estratto di un articolo dell'analista della sicurezza economica Koji Hirai, apparso sulla rivista mensile WiLL il 26 settembre in un formato a tre colonne, alle pagine 98-105.
Anche questo articolo dimostra che egli è uno dei tesori nazionali definiti da Saicho.
È una lettura obbligata non solo per i cittadini giapponesi, ma anche per quelli di tutto il mondo.

Violazioni dello spazio aereo e delle acque territoriali, sette organizzazioni per l'amicizia Giappone-Cina, gruppo parlamentare per l'amicizia Giappone-Cina...
Perché non creare una legge sul controspionaggio?
Non abbiamo bisogno di un “gasdotto per la Cina” che ci risucchia unilateralmente.

Qual è il “vero scopo” delle violazioni dello spazio aereo?
Un aereo per la raccolta di informazioni Y9 dell'Esercito Popolare di Liberazione cinese ha violato lo spazio aereo giapponese vicino alle isole Goto della prefettura di Nagasaki per circa due minuti (26 agosto).
Il giorno successivo, la Lega dell'amicizia parlamentare Giappone-Cina, che aveva visitato la Cina, ha incontrato Zhao Leji, presidente del Comitato permanente dell'Assemblea nazionale del popolo del Partito comunista cinese.
Hanno espresso il loro rammarico per la violazione dello spazio aereo giapponese da parte dell'Esercito Popolare di Liberazione e hanno chiesto di evitare che si ripeta, ma questo è tutto.
Durante l'incontro è stato deciso di rafforzare gli scambi tra Giappone e Cina e di continuare il dialogo.
La delegazione è tornata in patria senza avanzare alcuna rivendicazione basata sugli interessi nazionali del Giappone.
Nella guerra politica è essenziale diffondere la propaganda politica.
La Cina prende di mira l'élite politica del Paese in questione.
Questo perché sono in una posizione di potere e possono prendere decisioni politiche che influenzano direttamente gli interessi del Partito Comunista Cinese. 
Si dice che la guerra politica cinese vada oltre le tre battaglie (opinione pubblica, media, psicologica e legale) e il lavoro del fronte unito e che sia condotta combinando funzioni di soft power come la disinformazione e la manipolazione dei media, palese e occulta, con funzioni statali come lo spionaggio e le operazioni violente.
Poiché si svolge al di sotto della superficie, è la più difficile da analizzare e da scoprire e non ci sono informazioni pubblicamente note.
Che cos'è la guerra dell'opinione pubblica e dei media?
La propaganda viene diffusa alla popolazione del Paese obiettivo attraverso trasmissioni terrestri, programmi online, applicazioni video, film, libri, ecc.
L'obiettivo è influenzare l'opinione pubblica. I principali media giapponesi hanno riferito dell'incursione nello spazio aereo giapponese in modo da dare l'impressione che si trattasse di un “errore incauto” dell'Esercito Popolare di Liberazione, con titoli come “Aereo militare cinese viola lo spazio aereo, il Ministero della Difesa conferma per la prima volta, il governo presenta una dura protesta”.
Tuttavia, l'obiettivo era quello di raccogliere informazioni.
Quando gli aerei militari stranieri violano lo spazio aereo giapponese, i siti radar sparsi per Kyushu emettono onde radio come le frequenze radar.
Facendo violare lo spazio aereo giapponese a velivoli per la raccolta di informazioni, i militari cinesi hanno cercato di intercettare e raccogliere informazioni che i loro veicoli aerei senza equipaggio non potevano ottenere.
Queste informazioni sarebbero poi state analizzate e i dati del segnale sarebbero stati caricati nei radar di rilevamento dei jet da combattimento e nei missili anti-radar, che sarebbero poi stati utilizzati per attaccare i radar delle basi giapponesi e americane.
Perché i media giapponesi non hanno riportato questo fatto al pubblico? La strategia del fronte unito è una delle “armi magiche” che verranno utilizzate per realizzare il “sogno cinese” di Xi Jinping.
Ciò suggerisce che il lavoro di infiltrazione, la guerra dell'opinione pubblica e la guerra dei media della Cina stanno raggiungendo in profondità il nostro Paese.

Un'organizzazione segreta che sta erodendo il Giappone:
Nel gennaio 2019, la Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) statunitense ha pubblicato un rapporto intitolato “China's Military Power”.
Il rapporto ha rivelato che l'Ufficio di collegamento del Dipartimento politico, che fa parte dell'Ufficio di collegamento del Dipartimento del lavoro politico della Commissione militare centrale, sta conducendo una “guerra politica” contro gli Stati Uniti, Taiwan e soprattutto il Giappone, raccogliendo e analizzando informazioni relative ad alti funzionari di questi e altri Paesi. 
Nel giugno dello stesso anno, Russell H. Siu (Jamestown Foundation) ha pubblicato un rapporto intitolato “Preliminary Survey of Chinese Communist Party Influence Operations in Japan”.
Nel rapporto, Siu definisce la guerra politica come “un insieme di mezzi palesi o occulti usati da un governo per influenzare le percezioni, le convinzioni e le azioni di altri governi e società per raggiungere gli obiettivi nazionali”.
Afferma che non sono stati chiariti i mezzi con cui il PCC sta conducendo operazioni di influenza malevola contro il Giappone.
Afferma inoltre che è necessario indagare sulle agenzie e sui metodi di queste operazioni e sulla loro potenziale efficacia nell'influenzare il governo giapponese.
Il PCC conduce operazioni di influenza attraverso il “lavoro del fronte unito”, che consiste nell'influenzare, indottrinare e mobilitare persone e organizzazioni diverse dai membri del PCC per raggiungere gli obiettivi del partito.
Il Segretario Generale del Partito Comunista Cinese Xi Jinping si è concentrato sul lavoro del fronte unito e ha portato alla ribalta organizzazioni con un orientamento da fronte unito.
La principale organizzazione del fronte unito è il Consiglio per la promozione della pace e della riunificazione in Cina, o CCPPR, che dipende direttamente dal Dipartimento per il lavoro del fronte unito del PCC.
Il rapporto cita i nomi di alcune organizzazioni subordinate attive in Giappone, tra cui l'Associazione per la promozione della pace e della riunificazione in Cina di tutto il popolo cinese, l'Associazione per la promozione della pace e della riunificazione in Cina di tutto il popolo cinese e d'oltremare e la Federazione giapponese dei cinesi e dei cinesi d'oltremare.
Con il pretesto dello scambio privato, queste organizzazioni hanno il compito di orientare il dibattito interno in una direzione favorevole al Partito Comunista Cinese, creando un fronte unito tra il popolo giapponese.
L'Associazione cinese per i contatti amichevoli internazionali, guidata da Yang Wanming, è un'organizzazione che svolge attività di reclutamento delle élite principalmente attraverso scambi tra figure di alto livello (élite) in Giappone e in Cina.
L'Associazione del popolo cinese per l'amicizia con i Paesi stranieri ha un ufficio dedicato alle attività legate al Giappone.
La China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), affiliata al Dipartimento di lavoro politico della Commissione militare centrale, svolge operazioni di influenza attraverso i canali diplomatici, di sicurezza nazionale, di fronte unito, di propaganda e militari della Cina.
In Giappone, questa organizzazione interagisce con vari settori della società giapponese, tra cui gruppi religiosi, architetti, associazioni di calligrafia e veterani, e guida le operazioni del Fronte Unito. 
Anche la pericolosità degli Istituti Confucio, noti come il “cavallo di Troia” del Partito Comunista Cinese, è stata messa in discussione.
In Giappone ci sono 12 Istituti Confucio (Tabella 1).
Negli Stati Uniti si teme l'ingerenza dell'ambasciata cinese nei gruppi studenteschi e il Congresso degli Stati Uniti ha limitato i finanziamenti federali alle scuole che hanno accettato la creazione di Istituti Confucio.
Il Dipartimento di Stato ha riconosciuto il “Centro statunitense per gli Istituti Confucio” di Washington, che supervisiona gli Istituti Confucio negli Stati Uniti, come un'agenzia del governo cinese.
Secondo il General Accounting Office degli Stati Uniti, il numero di Istituti Confucio istituiti all'interno delle università statunitensi è diminuito da circa 100 a meno di cinque.
In Giappone, invece, siamo stati in grado di confermare solo la chiusura di tre scuole.
Qual è il motivo della mancata chiusura degli Istituti Confucio, che negli Stati Uniti sono visti come un pericolo?

Cosa sono le “Sette organizzazioni di amicizia Giappone-Cina”?
Il governo cinese riconosce ufficialmente sette organizzazioni come “organizzazioni di amicizia Giappone-Cina”.
La Lega parlamentare di amicizia Giappone-Cina, che abbiamo presentato all'inizio di questo articolo, è inclusa in questo gruppo, chiamato collettivamente “Sette organizzazioni di amicizia Giappone-Cina”.
Lega parlamentare di amicizia Giappone-Cina (Presidente: Toshihiro Nika)
Associazione di Amicizia Giappone-Cina (Presidente: Tokuichiro Utsunomiya)
Associazione per la promozione del commercio internazionale del Giappone (Presidente: Yohei Kono)
Associazione per lo Scambio Culturale Giappone-Cina (Presidente: Senji Kuroi)
Associazione economica Giappone-Cina (Presidente: Kosei Shindo)
Società Giappone-Cina (Presidente: Takeshi Noda)
Centro di Amicizia Giappone-Cina (Presidente: Yuji Miyamoto)
Diamo un'occhiata ai sette presidenti.
Toshihiro Nikai e Yohei Kono sono noti politici pro-Cina.
Tokio Utsunomiya è il nipote di Tokuma Utsunomiya, un politico noto per la sua posizione favorevole alla Cina.
Anche Takeo Noda è un membro dell'LDP ed ex membro della Camera dei Rappresentanti.
Senji Kuroi è uno scrittore e Yuji Miyamoto è un diplomatico ed ex ambasciatore in Cina.
Negli Stati Uniti, i partiti repubblicano e democratico hanno reagito contro l'acquisizione di US Steel da parte di Nippon Steel.
Alcuni ritengono che il motivo sia la relazione tra Nippon Steel e la Cina.
Nel già citato rapporto “China's Military Power”, il DIAM ha sottolineato che il governo cinese ha utilizzato sette gruppi di amicizia Giappone-Cina per sostenere le sue operazioni contro il Giappone.
Questi gruppi sono considerati con cautela in quanto organizzazioni che hanno lavorato all'unisono con il Partito Comunista Cinese, che governa lo Stato autoritario della Repubblica Popolare Cinese, per svolgere un lavoro di fronte unito nel nostro Paese libero e aperto. Oltre a queste organizzazioni di facciata del Partito Comunista Cinese, ci sono anche organizzazioni locali in Giappone che hanno legami con le organizzazioni che conducono la guerra politica in Cina.
Tuttavia, non entreremo nei dettagli in questa sede per motivi di spazio.
Se vi avvicinate a queste organizzazioni di facciata del Partito Comunista Cinese con noncuranza, potreste trovarvi coinvolti in una situazione irreversibile.

Infiltrazione del mondo politico giapponese attraverso politici pro-Cina 
L'infiltrazione nel mondo politico giapponese attraverso politici filo-cinesi è iniziata nel 1949, quando il Partito Comunista Cinese ha fondato la Repubblica Popolare Cinese.
La “Lega parlamentare per la promozione del commercio Giappone-Cina” (Chu-Nichi Girei), predecessore della Lega parlamentare di amicizia Giappone-Cina, ha svolto un ruolo importante.
La Chu-Nichi Girei aveva stretti legami con la “Lega di Difesa Democratica”, la più grande organizzazione del Fronte Unito del dopoguerra.
Ryoichiro Miyazaki e altri che lavoravano nella segreteria della Lega di Difesa Democratica avevano fatto parte della Showa Kenkyukai (Società per lo Studio del Periodo Showa) di Fumimaro Konoe insieme a Hidemitsu Ozaki, che prima della guerra era una spia sovietica.
Dopo la guerra, proposero a Kei Hashiashi, impegnato a fondare la Japan Association of Corporate Executives, di “collegare le attività della Japan-China Trade Promotion Association con la Dieta per allentare l'embargo sul commercio con la Cina e le restrizioni sui viaggi in Cina”.
Nel maggio 1949 è stata fondata la Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina.
All'epoca il Giappone era sotto l'occupazione del Quartier Generale.
Le aziende cercavano un modo per uscire dalla recessione del dopoguerra.
Le aziende non riuscivano a liberarsi dall'esperienza commerciale tra l'Impero del Giappone e la Repubblica di Cina prima della guerra, e non erano consapevoli dei rischi del commercio con i Paesi comunisti.
Non potendo ignorare le azioni delle aziende che costituivano la loro base di sostegno, non solo i politici di sinistra ma anche quelli conservatori si unirono alla Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina.
La Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese rafforzò la sua influenza nella Dieta incorporando politici conservatori e collegando il governo con organizzazioni affini.
Il governo cinese, che puntava a ottenere il sostegno del popolo giapponese attraverso le proteste antiamericane, iniziò a valorizzare la Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese facendo pressioni sul governo giapponese ed eliminando le restrizioni al commercio nippo-cinese.

Il prototipo della coercizione economica.
Nel giugno 1950, la Corea del Nord iniziò la guerra di Corea.
Nel maggio successivo fu approvata una legge che imponeva l'embargo alla Cina e nessun membro della Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese chiese che venissero eliminati gli scambi commerciali tra Giappone e Cina.
La svolta avvenne nel 1952.
Il Giappone riacquistò l'indipendenza con l'entrata in vigore del Trattato di San Francisco il 28 aprile 1952.
Nello stesso mese, il premier Zhou Enlai ricevette l'informazione che tre membri della Dieta giapponese avrebbero partecipato a una conferenza economica internazionale che si teneva a Mosca, nell'allora Unione Sovietica, e diede istruzioni alla delegazione cinese diretta alla conferenza di invitare i tre membri della Dieta a visitare la Cina.
Si trattava di Hoshi Kei, membro della Camera dei Consiglieri (del Partito del Vento Verde), Takara Tomi, membro della Camera dei Consiglieri (del Partito del Vento Verde) e Miyakoshi Kisosuke, membro della Camera dei Rappresentanti (del Partito Democratico del Giappone).
I tre accettarono l'invito di Zhou Enlai e, dopo aver partecipato alla conferenza economica internazionale, volarono a Pechino con i loro due segretari, dove presero i primi contatti con gli alti funzionari della neonata Repubblica Popolare Cinese.
A giugno, in qualità di rappresentanti dell'organizzazione per la promozione del commercio Giappone-Cina, hanno concluso il primo accordo commerciale privato Giappone-Cina con il Consiglio cinese per la promozione del commercio internazionale.
Con l'avanzare dei negoziati per il cessate il fuoco nella penisola coreana, la domanda di beni legati alla guerra in Giappone è diminuita.
Di fronte al calo delle esportazioni, alcuni esponenti della comunità imprenditoriale hanno iniziato a chiedere la ripresa degli scambi con la Cina comunista.
In questo contesto, fu istituita la Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina per la promozione del commercio (Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina) (1952).
La Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese disponeva di “organizzazioni locali diramate in assemblee locali” che la Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese non aveva.
Anche le assemblee locali di ogni prefettura e municipalità formarono leghe parlamentari, e la Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese arrivò ad avere un'influenza a livello nazionale attraverso queste leghe parlamentari. 
Quando fu firmato l'accordo di armistizio per la guerra di Corea, alcuni esponenti della comunità imprenditoriale giapponese chiesero che il Giappone ignorasse i rischi di fare affari con i Paesi comunisti e si concentrasse invece sul commercio con la Cina.
Una delegazione guidata dal capo della Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina e dal Consiglio cinese per la promozione del commercio internazionale firmò il secondo accordo commerciale Giappone-Cina.
Nonostante le obiezioni dei governi degli Stati Uniti e della ROC, il primo ministro Ichiro Hatoyama ha firmato il terzo accordo commerciale Giappone-Cina, che prevedeva chiaramente l'istituzione di un ufficio di rappresentanza commerciale e la conclusione di un accordo di pagamento tra le banche nazionali.
Con la firma dell'accordo, la Lega parlamentare nippo-cinese e le sue organizzazioni locali hanno esercitato pressioni sulla Dieta e su altri organi per la cooperazione. 
Il quarto accordo commerciale sino-giapponese fu firmato nel marzo 1958. Tuttavia, nell'aprile dell'anno successivo, la Cina insistette per una proroga indefinita della sua attuazione.
Il governo cinese cercò di convincere il governo giapponese a riconoscere la Repubblica Popolare Cinese utilizzando le clausole politiche aggiunte al Terzo Accordo Commerciale Sino-Giapponese e al Quarto Accordo Commerciale Sino-Giapponese.
In risposta, l'amministrazione conservatrice del Primo Ministro Nobusuke Kishi rilasciò una dichiarazione in cui affermava che il Giappone non aveva intenzione di riconoscere la Cina.
Il commercio tra Giappone e Cina fu interrotto senza che si realizzassero le speranze della Cina di stabilire relazioni diplomatiche.
La Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina era l'unica organizzazione che aveva firmato tutti gli accordi commerciali privati tra Giappone e Cina. 
Sebbene il commercio tra Giappone e Cina fosse stato temporaneamente interrotto, Zhou Enlai, che sentiva fortemente la necessità di un commercio privato con il Giappone, annunciò i Tre Principi del Commercio con il Giappone.
Il commercio privato tra il Giappone e la Cina riprese, ma la situazione continuava a prevedere che solo le società commerciali amiche selezionate dal governo cinese potessero partecipare al commercio. 
Con il permesso del Partito Comunista Cinese, i gruppi filo-cinesi monopolizzarono le società commerciali amiche e gli uomini d'affari filo-cinesi ne trassero profitto.
Per gli uomini d'affari pro-Cina, il profitto ottenuto senza lavorare per ottenerlo era come una droga.
Le aziende giapponesi, insoddisfatte della situazione in cui alcune aziende ricevevano un trattamento preferenziale in Cina, hanno formato gruppi in ogni settore e hanno iniziato a fare affari con la Cina.
Si può già vedere il prototipo della coercizione economica che la Cina utilizza ancora oggi. 
L'anno successivo all'instaurazione delle relazioni diplomatiche tra Giappone e Cina, si formò la Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina per la promozione del commercio, che in seguito divenne Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina per l'amicizia (1973).
Il primo presidente della Lega, Aichiro Fujiyama, fu eletto per la prima volta alla Camera dei Rappresentanti nelle elezioni generali del 1958 come candidato del Partito Liberale Democratico.
Come ministro degli Esteri, ha ripetutamente sostenuto e collaborato alla promozione del commercio tra Giappone e Cina.
Nel 1971, in qualità di leader di una delegazione della Lega parlamentare Giappone-Cina per il ripristino delle relazioni diplomatiche, Fujiyama firmò una dichiarazione congiunta con la Repubblica Popolare Cinese che dichiarava nullo il trattato Giappone-Taiwan.
L'LDP lo punì per questo, considerato un atto di tradimento contro lo Stato.
Anche dopo il ritiro dalla politica, Fujiyama si impegnò nella conclusione delle relazioni diplomatiche tra Giappone e Cina.

Lega parlamentare di amicizia Giappone-Cina
Oltre a Fujiyama, gli altri presidenti della Lega di amicizia parlamentare Giappone-Cina sono stati Masayoshi Ito, Yoshiro Hayashi (padre di Yoshimasa Hayashi), Masahiko Koumura, Yoshimasa Hayashi e Toshihiro Nika (attuale presidente).
L'elenco dei membri del gruppo parlamentare non è stato reso pubblico, ma i membri della Dieta che sono noti per essere affiliati al gruppo sono mostrati nella Tabella 2. 
Secondo la suddetta “Indagine preliminare sulle attività di influenza del Partito Comunista Cinese in Giappone”, la fazione filo-cinese più potente dell'LDP in Giappone era quella di Tanaka/Takeshita (Mogi).
Tuttavia, l'influenza di queste fazioni si è indebolita.
Altri gruppi politici che potrebbero essere suscettibili all'influenza del Partito Comunista Cinese sono il New Komeito Party, le fazioni liberali all'interno dell'LDP (come il Kouchikai) e i gruppi della coalizione di opposizione guidata da Ichiro Ozawa.
Non possiamo permettere che continuino a infiltrarsi nel mondo politico.
Il nuovo governo deve approvare immediatamente una legge sul controspionaggio.


2024/10/6 in Umeda



Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League

2024年10月08日 15時44分19秒 | 全般
The following is an excerpt from an article by economic security analyst Koji Hirai, which appeared in the monthly magazine WiLL on September 26 in a three-column format on pages 98 to 105.
This article also proves that he is one of the national treasures defined by Saicho.
It is a must-read not only for Japanese citizens but also for people worldwide.

Airspace and territorial waters violations, seven organizations for Japan-China friendship, Japan-China friendship parliamentary group...
Why not create a counterespionage law?
We don't need a "pipeline to China" that just sucks us in unilaterally.

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?
A Y9 intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army violated Japanese airspace near the Nagasaki Prefecture Goto Islands for about two minutes (August 26).
The following day, the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League, which had visited China, met with Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China.
They expressed their regret at the violation of Japanese airspace by the People's Liberation Army and called for a recurrence to be prevented, but that was all.
At this meeting, it was decided that the exchanges between Japan and China should be strengthened and dialogue should continue.
The delegation returned home without making any claims based on Japan's national interests.
In political warfare, it is essential to spread political propaganda.
China targets the political elite of the country it is targeting.
It is because they are in a position to exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. 
China's political warfare is said to go beyond the three battles (public opinion, media, psychological, and legal battles) and united front work and to be carried out by combining soft power functions such as disinformation and overt and covert media manipulation with state functions such as espionage and violent operations.
Because it is carried out below the surface, it is the most difficult to analyze and discover, and there is no publicly known information.
What is public opinion and media warfare?
Propaganda is disseminated to the people of the target country through terrestrial broadcasting, online programming, video apps, movies, books, etc.
The aim is to influence public opinion. The major Japanese media reported on the incursion above into Japanese airspace in a way that gave the impression that it was a "careless mistake" by the People's Liberation Army, with headlines such as "Chinese military aircraft violates airspace, Ministry of Defense confirms for the first time, government lodges stern protest."
However, the aim was to gather information.
When foreign military aircraft violate Japanese airspace, radar sites scattered around Kyushu emit radio waves such as radar frequencies.
By having information-gathering aircraft violate Japanese airspace, the Chinese military attempted to intercept and gather information that their uncrewed aerial vehicles could not.
This information would then be analyzed, and the signal data would be loaded into the fighter jets' detection radar and anti-radar missiles, which would then be used to attack the radar of Japanese and American bases.
Why didn't the Japanese media report this fact to the public? The strategy of a united front is one of the "magic weapons" that will be used to achieve Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream."
It suggests that China's infiltration work, public opinion war, and media war are reaching deep into our country.


A Covert Organization Eroding Japan:
In January 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a report titled "China's Military Power."
The report revealed that the Political Department Liaison Bureau, which is part of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, is conducting "political warfare" against the US, Taiwan, and especially Japan and gathering and analyzing information related to senior officials in these and other countries. 
In June of the same year, Russell H. Siu (Jamestown Foundation) published a report entitled "Preliminary Survey of Chinese Communist Party Influence Operations in Japan."
In the report, Mr. Siu defines political warfare as "a set of overt or covert means used by a government to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of other governments and societies to achieve national objectives."
He states that the means by which the CCP is conducting malicious influence operations against Japan have not been clarified.
He also states that it is necessary to investigate the agencies and methods of these operations and their potential effectiveness in influencing the Japanese government.
The CCP conducts influence operations through "united front work," which involves influencing, indoctrinating, and mobilizing people and organizations other than CCP members to achieve the party's goals.
The Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary Xi Jinping has focused on united front work and brought organizations to the fore with a united front orientation.
The main united front organization is the China Peace and Reunification Promotion Council, or the CCPPR, which is directly under the CCP's United Front Work Department.
The report mentions the names of some of the subordinate organizations active in Japan, including the All Japan Chinese People Promotion China Peace and Reunification Association, the All Japan Overseas Chinese and Chinese People China Peace and Reunification Promotion Association, and the Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese and Chinese People.
Under the guise of private exchange, these organizations are tasked with steering the domestic discussion in a direction favorable to the Chinese Communist Party by creating a united front among the Japanese people.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact, led by Yang Wanming, is an organization that conducts elite recruitment activities mainly through exchanges between high-level (elite) figures in Japan and China.
The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has a bureau dedicated to Japan-related activities.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), affiliated with the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, carries out influence operations through China's diplomatic, national security, united front, propaganda, and military channels.
In Japan, this organization interacts with various sectors of Japanese society, including religious groups, architects, calligraphy associations, and veterans, and guides United Front operations. 
The danger of the Confucius Institutes, known as the "Trojan Horse" of the Chinese Communist Party, has also been questioned.
There are 12 Confucius Institutes in Japan (Table 1).
In the United States, there are concerns about the Chinese embassy's interference in student groups, and the US Congress has restricted federal funding for schools that have accepted the establishment of Confucius Institutes.
The State Department has recognized the "US Center for Confucius Institutes" in Washington, which oversees Confucius Institutes across the United States, as an agency of the Chinese government.
According to the US General Accounting Office, the number of Confucius Institutes established within US universities has decreased from around 100 to less than five.
However, in Japan, we have only been able to confirm the closure of three schools.
What is the reason for not closing the Confucius Institutes, which are seen as a danger in the United States?

What are the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations"?
The Chinese government officially recognizes seven organizations as "Japan-China friendship organizations."
The Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, which we introduced at the beginning of this article, is included in this group, collectively called the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations."
・Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship (Chairman: Toshihiro Nika)
・Japan-China Friendship Association (Chairman: Tokuichiro Utsunomiya)
・Japan International Trade Promotion Association (Chairman: Yohei Kono)
・Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (Chairman: Senji Kuroi)
・Japan-China Economic Association (Chairman: Kosei Shindo)
・Japan-China Society (Chairman: Takeshi Noda)
・Japan-China Friendship Center (Chairman: Yuji Miyamoto)
Let's take a look at the seven chairpersons.
Toshihiro Nikai and Yohei Kono are well-known pro-China politicians.
Tokio Utsunomiya is the grandson of Tokuma Utsunomiya, a politician known for his pro-China stance.
Takeo Noda is also a member of the LDP and a former member of the House of Representatives.
Senji Kuroi is a novelist, and Yuji Miyamoto is a diplomat and former ambassador to China.
In the United States, the Republican and Democratic parties have reacted against Nippon Steel's acquisition of US Steel.
Some believe that the reason for this is the relationship between Nippon Steel and China.
In the aforementioned report, "China's Military Power," the DIAM pointed out that the Chinese government has been using seven Japan-China friendship groups to support its operations against Japan.
They are viewed with caution as organizations that have worked in unison with the Chinese Communist Party, which rules the authoritarian state of the People's Republic of China, to carry out united front work in our free and open country. In addition to these Chinese Communist Party front organizations, there are also local organizations in Japan that have ties to organizations that carry out political warfare in China.
Still, we will not go into detail here due to space limitations.
If you approach these Chinese Communist Party front organizations carelessly, you may find yourself caught up in an irreversible situation.

Infiltrating the Japanese political world through pro-China politicians 
The infiltration of Japanese politics through pro-China politicians began in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China.
The "Japan-China Trade Promotion Parliamentary League" (Chu-Nichi Girei), the predecessor of the Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, played an important role.
The Chu-Nichi Girei had close ties with the "Democratic Defense League," the largest post-war United Front organization.
Ryoichiro Miyazaki and others who worked in the secretariat of the Democratic Defense League had belonged to Fumimaro Konoe's Showa Kenkyukai (Society for the Study of the Showa Period) together with Hidemitsu Ozaki, who was a Soviet spy before the war.
After the war, they proposed to Kei Hashiashi, who was busy establishing the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, that they "link the activities of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association with the Diet to ease the embargo on trade with China and restrictions on travel to China."
In May 1949, the Japan-China Parliamentary League was established.
At the time, Japan was under the occupation of GHQ.
Companies were looking for ways to get out of the post-war recession.
Companies could not break free from the trade experience between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China before the war, and they lacked awareness of the risks of trade with communist countries.
They could not ignore the actions of the companies that were their support base, and not only left-wing politicians but also conservative politicians joined the Japan-China Parliamentary League.
The Japan-China Parliamentary League strengthened its influence in the Diet by incorporating conservative politicians and connecting the government with related organizations.
The Chinese government, which focused on gaining the support of the Japanese people through anti-American protests, began to value the Japan-China Parliamentary League by lobbying the Japanese government and lifting restrictions on Japan-China trade.

The prototype of economic coercion.
In June 1950, North Korea started the Korean War.
The following May, a bill was passed to impose an embargo on China, and no members of the Japan-China Parliamentary League called for trade between Japan and China.
The turning point came in 1952.
Japan regained its independence with the coming into force of the Treaty of San Francisco on April 28, 1952.
That same month, Premier Zhou Enlai received information that three members of the Japanese Diet were to participate in an international economic conference being held in Moscow, then in the Soviet Union, and instructed the delegation heading to the conference from China to invite the three Diet members to visit China.
The three were Mr. Hoshi Kei, a member of the House of Councillors (from the Green Wind Party); Ms. Takara Tomi, a member of the House of Councillors (from the Green Wind Party); and Mr. Miyakoshi Kisosuke, a member of the House of Representatives (from the Democratic Party of Japan).
The three accepted Zhou Enlai's invitation and, after attending the international economic conference, flew to Beijing with their two secretaries, where they made initial contact with the senior officials of the newly established People's Republic of China.
In June, they concluded the first Japan-China private trade agreement as representatives of the Japan-China trade promotion organization with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
As negotiations for a ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula progressed, demand for war-related goods in Japan decreased.
Faced with a decline in exports, some in the business community began to call for the resumption of trade with Communist China.
In this context, the Japan-China Parliamentary League for the Promotion of Trade (Japan-China Parliamentary League) was established (in 1952).
The Japan-China Parliamentary League had "local branch organizations in local assemblies" that the Japan-China Parliamentary League did not have.
Local assemblies in each prefecture and municipality also formed parliamentary leagues, and the Japan-China Parliamentary League came to have nationwide influence through these parliamentary leagues. 
When the armistice agreement for the Korean War was signed, some in the Japanese business community called for Japan to ignore the risks of doing business with communist countries and instead focus on trade with China.
A delegation led by the head of the Japan-China Parliamentary League and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade signed the second Japan-China Trade Agreement.
Over the objections of the US and ROC governments, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama signed the Third Japan-China Trade Agreement, which clearly stated the establishment of a trade representative office and the conclusion of a payment agreement between national banks.
In signing the agreement, the Japan-China Parliamentary League and its local organizations lobbied the Diet and other bodies for cooperation. 
The Fourth Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement was signed in March 1958. However, in April of the following year, China insisted on an indefinite extension of its implementation.
The Chinese government tried to get the Japanese government to recognize the People's Republic of China by using the political clauses added to the Third Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement and the Fourth Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement.
In response, the conservative administration of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi issued a statement saying that Japan had no intention of recognizing China.
Japan-China trade was cut off without realizing China's hopes for establishing diplomatic relations.
The Japan-China Parliamentary League was the only organization that had signed all the Japan-China private trade agreements. 
Although trade between Japan and China was temporarily cut off, Zhou Enlai, who keenly felt the need for private trade with Japan, announced the Three Principles of Trade with Japan.
Private trade between Japan and China resumed, but the situation continued where only friendly trading companies selected by the Chinese government could participate in trade. 
With the permission of the Chinese Communist Party, pro-China groups monopolized the friendly trading companies, and pro-China business people made a profit.
For pro-China business people, the profit they made without working for it was like a drug.
Japanese companies, dissatisfied with the situation where certain companies were given preferential treatment in China, formed groups in each industry and began doing business with China.
The prototype of the economic coercion that China still uses today can already be seen. 
The year after diplomatic relations were established between Japan and China, the Japan-China Parliamentary League for the Promotion of Trade was formed, which later became the Japan-China Parliamentary League for Friendship (1973).
The first president of the league, Aichiro Fujiyama, was first elected to the House of Representatives in the 1958 general election as a Liberal Democratic Party candidate.
As foreign minister, he repeatedly supported and cooperated in promoting Japan-China trade.
In 1971, as the leader of a delegation of the Japan-China Parliamentary League for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations, Fujiyama signed a joint statement with the People's Republic of China declaring the Japan-Taiwan Treaty null and void.
The LDP punished him for this, as it was considered an act of treason against the state.
Even after retiring from politics, Fujiyama was involved in the conclusion of diplomatic relations between Japan and China.

Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League
In addition to Fujiyama, the other presidents of the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League have been Masayoshi Ito, Yoshiro Hayashi (father of Yoshimasa Hayashi), Masahiko Koumura, Yoshimasa Hayashi, and Toshihiro Nika (current president).
The membership list of the parliamentary group is not made public, but the Diet members who are known to be affiliated with the group are shown in Table 2. 
According to the above "Preliminary Survey on the Influence Activities of the Chinese Communist Party in Japan," the LDP's most potent pro-China faction in Japan was the Tanaka/Takeshita (Mogi) faction. 
Still, the influence of these factions has been weakening.
Other political groups that may be susceptible to the influence of the Chinese Communist Party include the New Komeito Party, the liberal factions within the LDP (such as the Kouchikai), and the groups within the opposition coalition led by Ichiro Ozawa.
We cannot allow them to continue infiltrating the political world any longer.
The new government needs to pass a counterespionage law immediately.



2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka







The prototype of economic coercion.

2024年10月08日 15時37分42秒 | 全般
The following is an excerpt from an article by economic security analyst Koji Hirai, which appeared in the monthly magazine WiLL on September 26 in a three-column format on pages 98 to 105.
This article also proves that he is one of the national treasures defined by Saicho.
It is a must-read not only for Japanese citizens but also for people worldwide.

Airspace and territorial waters violations, seven organizations for Japan-China friendship, Japan-China friendship parliamentary group...
Why not create a counterespionage law?
We don't need a "pipeline to China" that just sucks us in unilaterally.

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?
A Y9 intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army violated Japanese airspace near the Nagasaki Prefecture Goto Islands for about two minutes (August 26).
The following day, the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League, which had visited China, met with Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China.
They expressed their regret at the violation of Japanese airspace by the People's Liberation Army and called for a recurrence to be prevented, but that was all.
At this meeting, it was decided that the exchanges between Japan and China should be strengthened and dialogue should continue.
The delegation returned home without making any claims based on Japan's national interests.
In political warfare, it is essential to spread political propaganda.
China targets the political elite of the country it is targeting.
It is because they are in a position to exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. 
China's political warfare is said to go beyond the three battles (public opinion, media, psychological, and legal battles) and united front work and to be carried out by combining soft power functions such as disinformation and overt and covert media manipulation with state functions such as espionage and violent operations.
Because it is carried out below the surface, it is the most difficult to analyze and discover, and there is no publicly known information.
What is public opinion and media warfare?
Propaganda is disseminated to the people of the target country through terrestrial broadcasting, online programming, video apps, movies, books, etc.
The aim is to influence public opinion. The major Japanese media reported on the incursion above into Japanese airspace in a way that gave the impression that it was a "careless mistake" by the People's Liberation Army, with headlines such as "Chinese military aircraft violates airspace, Ministry of Defense confirms for the first time, government lodges stern protest."
However, the aim was to gather information.
When foreign military aircraft violate Japanese airspace, radar sites scattered around Kyushu emit radio waves such as radar frequencies.
By having information-gathering aircraft violate Japanese airspace, the Chinese military attempted to intercept and gather information that their uncrewed aerial vehicles could not.
This information would then be analyzed, and the signal data would be loaded into the fighter jets' detection radar and anti-radar missiles, which would then be used to attack the radar of Japanese and American bases.
Why didn't the Japanese media report this fact to the public? The strategy of a united front is one of the "magic weapons" that will be used to achieve Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream."
It suggests that China's infiltration work, public opinion war, and media war are reaching deep into our country.


A Covert Organization Eroding Japan:
In January 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a report titled "China's Military Power."
The report revealed that the Political Department Liaison Bureau, which is part of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, is conducting "political warfare" against the US, Taiwan, and especially Japan and gathering and analyzing information related to senior officials in these and other countries. 
In June of the same year, Russell H. Siu (Jamestown Foundation) published a report entitled "Preliminary Survey of Chinese Communist Party Influence Operations in Japan."
In the report, Mr. Siu defines political warfare as "a set of overt or covert means used by a government to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of other governments and societies to achieve national objectives."
He states that the means by which the CCP is conducting malicious influence operations against Japan have not been clarified.
He also states that it is necessary to investigate the agencies and methods of these operations and their potential effectiveness in influencing the Japanese government.
The CCP conducts influence operations through "united front work," which involves influencing, indoctrinating, and mobilizing people and organizations other than CCP members to achieve the party's goals.
The Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary Xi Jinping has focused on united front work and brought organizations to the fore with a united front orientation.
The main united front organization is the China Peace and Reunification Promotion Council, or the CCPPR, which is directly under the CCP's United Front Work Department.
The report mentions the names of some of the subordinate organizations active in Japan, including the All Japan Chinese People Promotion China Peace and Reunification Association, the All Japan Overseas Chinese and Chinese People China Peace and Reunification Promotion Association, and the Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese and Chinese People.
Under the guise of private exchange, these organizations are tasked with steering the domestic discussion in a direction favorable to the Chinese Communist Party by creating a united front among the Japanese people.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact, led by Yang Wanming, is an organization that conducts elite recruitment activities mainly through exchanges between high-level (elite) figures in Japan and China.
The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has a bureau dedicated to Japan-related activities.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), affiliated with the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, carries out influence operations through China's diplomatic, national security, united front, propaganda, and military channels.
In Japan, this organization interacts with various sectors of Japanese society, including religious groups, architects, calligraphy associations, and veterans, and guides United Front operations. 
The danger of the Confucius Institutes, known as the "Trojan Horse" of the Chinese Communist Party, has also been questioned.
There are 12 Confucius Institutes in Japan (Table 1).
In the United States, there are concerns about the Chinese embassy's interference in student groups, and the US Congress has restricted federal funding for schools that have accepted the establishment of Confucius Institutes.
The State Department has recognized the "US Center for Confucius Institutes" in Washington, which oversees Confucius Institutes across the United States, as an agency of the Chinese government.
According to the US General Accounting Office, the number of Confucius Institutes established within US universities has decreased from around 100 to less than five.
However, in Japan, we have only been able to confirm the closure of three schools.
What is the reason for not closing the Confucius Institutes, which are seen as a danger in the United States?

What are the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations"?
The Chinese government officially recognizes seven organizations as "Japan-China friendship organizations."
The Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, which we introduced at the beginning of this article, is included in this group, collectively called the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations."
・Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship (Chairman: Toshihiro Nika)
・Japan-China Friendship Association (Chairman: Tokuichiro Utsunomiya)
・Japan International Trade Promotion Association (Chairman: Yohei Kono)
・Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (Chairman: Senji Kuroi)
・Japan-China Economic Association (Chairman: Kosei Shindo)
・Japan-China Society (Chairman: Takeshi Noda)
・Japan-China Friendship Center (Chairman: Yuji Miyamoto)
Let's take a look at the seven chairpersons.
Toshihiro Nikai and Yohei Kono are well-known pro-China politicians.
Tokio Utsunomiya is the grandson of Tokuma Utsunomiya, a politician known for his pro-China stance.
Takeo Noda is also a member of the LDP and a former member of the House of Representatives.
Senji Kuroi is a novelist, and Yuji Miyamoto is a diplomat and former ambassador to China.
In the United States, the Republican and Democratic parties have reacted against Nippon Steel's acquisition of US Steel.
Some believe that the reason for this is the relationship between Nippon Steel and China.
In the aforementioned report, "China's Military Power," the DIAM pointed out that the Chinese government has been using seven Japan-China friendship groups to support its operations against Japan.
They are viewed with caution as organizations that have worked in unison with the Chinese Communist Party, which rules the authoritarian state of the People's Republic of China, to carry out united front work in our free and open country. In addition to these Chinese Communist Party front organizations, there are also local organizations in Japan that have ties to organizations that carry out political warfare in China.
Still, we will not go into detail here due to space limitations.
If you approach these Chinese Communist Party front organizations carelessly, you may find yourself caught up in an irreversible situation.

Infiltrating the Japanese political world through pro-China politicians 
The infiltration of Japanese politics through pro-China politicians began in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China.
The "Japan-China Trade Promotion Parliamentary League" (Chu-Nichi Girei), the predecessor of the Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, played an important role.
The Chu-Nichi Girei had close ties with the "Democratic Defense League," the largest post-war United Front organization.
Ryoichiro Miyazaki and others who worked in the secretariat of the Democratic Defense League had belonged to Fumimaro Konoe's Showa Kenkyukai (Society for the Study of the Showa Period) together with Hidemitsu Ozaki, who was a Soviet spy before the war.
After the war, they proposed to Kei Hashiashi, who was busy establishing the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, that they "link the activities of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association with the Diet to ease the embargo on trade with China and restrictions on travel to China."
In May 1949, the Japan-China Parliamentary League was established.
At the time, Japan was under the occupation of GHQ.
Companies were looking for ways to get out of the post-war recession.
Companies could not break free from the trade experience between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China before the war, and they lacked awareness of the risks of trade with communist countries.
They could not ignore the actions of the companies that were their support base, and not only left-wing politicians but also conservative politicians joined the Japan-China Parliamentary League.
The Japan-China Parliamentary League strengthened its influence in the Diet by incorporating conservative politicians and connecting the government with related organizations.
The Chinese government, which focused on gaining the support of the Japanese people through anti-American protests, began to value the Japan-China Parliamentary League by lobbying the Japanese government and lifting restrictions on Japan-China trade.

The prototype of economic coercion.
In June 1950, North Korea started the Korean War.
The following May, a bill was passed to impose an embargo on China, and no members of the Japan-China Parliamentary League called for trade between Japan and China.
The turning point came in 1952.
Japan regained its independence with the coming into force of the Treaty of San Francisco on April 28, 1952.
That same month, Premier Zhou Enlai received information that three members of the Japanese Diet were to participate in an international economic conference being held in Moscow, then in the Soviet Union, and instructed the delegation heading to the conference from China to invite the three Diet members to visit China.
The three were Mr. Hoshi Kei, a member of the House of Councillors (from the Green Wind Party); Ms. Takara Tomi, a member of the House of Councillors (from the Green Wind Party); and Mr. Miyakoshi Kisosuke, a member of the House of Representatives (from the Democratic Party of Japan).
The three accepted Zhou Enlai's invitation and, after attending the international economic conference, flew to Beijing with their two secretaries, where they made initial contact with the senior officials of the newly established People's Republic of China.
In June, they concluded the first Japan-China private trade agreement as representatives of the Japan-China trade promotion organization with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
As negotiations for a ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula progressed, demand for war-related goods in Japan decreased.
Faced with a decline in exports, some in the business community began to call for the resumption of trade with Communist China.
In this context, the Japan-China Parliamentary League for the Promotion of Trade (Japan-China Parliamentary League) was established (in 1952).
The Japan-China Parliamentary League had "local branch organizations in local assemblies" that the Japan-China Parliamentary League did not have.
Local assemblies in each prefecture and municipality also formed parliamentary leagues, and the Japan-China Parliamentary League came to have nationwide influence through these parliamentary leagues. 
When the armistice agreement for the Korean War was signed, some in the Japanese business community called for Japan to ignore the risks of doing business with communist countries and instead focus on trade with China.
A delegation led by the head of the Japan-China Parliamentary League and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade signed the second Japan-China Trade Agreement.
Over the objections of the US and ROC governments, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama signed the Third Japan-China Trade Agreement, which clearly stated the establishment of a trade representative office and the conclusion of a payment agreement between national banks.
In signing the agreement, the Japan-China Parliamentary League and its local organizations lobbied the Diet and other bodies for cooperation. 
The Fourth Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement was signed in March 1958. However, in April of the following year, China insisted on an indefinite extension of its implementation.
The Chinese government tried to get the Japanese government to recognize the People's Republic of China by using the political clauses added to the Third Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement and the Fourth Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement.
In response, the conservative administration of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi issued a statement saying that Japan had no intention of recognizing China.
Japan-China trade was cut off without realizing China's hopes for establishing diplomatic relations.
The Japan-China Parliamentary League was the only organization that had signed all the Japan-China private trade agreements. 
Although trade between Japan and China was temporarily cut off, Zhou Enlai, who keenly felt the need for private trade with Japan, announced the Three Principles of Trade with Japan.
Private trade between Japan and China resumed, but the situation continued where only friendly trading companies selected by the Chinese government could participate in trade. 
With the permission of the Chinese Communist Party, pro-China groups monopolized the friendly trading companies, and pro-China business people made a profit.
For pro-China business people, the profit they made without working for it was like a drug.
Japanese companies, dissatisfied with the situation where certain companies were given preferential treatment in China, formed groups in each industry and began doing business with China.
The prototype of the economic coercion that China still uses today can already be seen. 
The year after diplomatic relations were established between Japan and China, the Japan-China Parliamentary League for the Promotion of Trade was formed, which later became the Japan-China Parliamentary League for Friendship (1973).
The first president of the league, Aichiro Fujiyama, was first elected to the House of Representatives in the 1958 general election as a Liberal Democratic Party candidate.
As foreign minister, he repeatedly expressed his support for and cooperation in promoting Japan-China trade. 
In 1971, as the leader of a delegation of the Japan-China Parliamentary League for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations, Fujiyama signed a joint statement with the People's Republic of China declaring the Japan-Taiwan Treaty null and void.
The LDP punished him for this, as it was considered an act of treason against the state.
Even after retiring from politics, Fujiyama was involved in the conclusion of diplomatic relations between Japan and China.
This article continues.



2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka





Infiltrating the Japanese political world through pro-China politicians

2024年10月08日 15時26分15秒 | 全般
The following is an excerpt from an article by economic security analyst Koji Hirai, which appeared in the monthly magazine WiLL on September 26 in a three-column format on pages 98 to 105.
This article also proves that he is one of the national treasures defined by Saicho.
It is a must-read not only for Japanese citizens but also for people worldwide.

Airspace and territorial waters violations, seven organizations for Japan-China friendship, Japan-China friendship parliamentary group...
Why not create a counterespionage law?
We don't need a "pipeline to China" that just sucks us in unilaterally.

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?
A Y9 intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army violated Japanese airspace near the Nagasaki Prefecture Goto Islands for about two minutes (August 26).
The following day, the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League, which had visited China, met with Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China.
They expressed their regret at the violation of Japanese airspace by the People's Liberation Army and called for a recurrence to be prevented, but that was all.
At this meeting, it was decided to strengthen exchanges between Japan and China and continue dialogue. 
The delegation returned home without making any claims based on Japan's national interests.
In political warfare, it is essential to spread political propaganda.
China targets the political elite of the country it is targeting.
It is because they are in a position to exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. 
China's political warfare is said to go beyond the three battles (public opinion, media, psychological, and legal battles) and united front work and to be carried out by combining soft power functions such as disinformation and overt and covert media manipulation with state functions such as espionage and violent operations.
Because it is carried out below the surface, it is the most difficult to analyze and discover, and there is no publicly known information.
What is public opinion and media warfare?
Propaganda is disseminated to the people of the target country through terrestrial broadcasting, online programming, video apps, movies, books, etc.
The aim is to influence public opinion. The major Japanese media reported on the incursion above into Japanese airspace in a way that gave the impression that it was a "careless mistake" by the People's Liberation Army, with headlines such as "Chinese military aircraft violates airspace, Ministry of Defense confirms for the first time, government lodges stern protest."
However, the aim was to gather information.
When foreign military aircraft violate Japanese airspace, radar sites scattered around Kyushu emit radio waves such as radar frequencies.
By having information-gathering aircraft violate Japanese airspace, the Chinese military attempted to intercept and gather information that their uncrewed aerial vehicles could not.
This information would then be analyzed, and the signal data would be loaded into the fighter jets' detection radar and anti-radar missiles, which would then be used to attack the radar of Japanese and American bases.
Why didn't the Japanese media report this fact to the public? The strategy of a united front is one of the "magic weapons" that will be used to achieve Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream."
It suggests that China's infiltration work, public opinion war, and media war are reaching deep into our country.

A Covert Organization Eroding Japan:
In January 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a report titled "China's Military Power."
The report revealed that the Political Department Liaison Bureau, which is part of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, is conducting "political warfare" against the US, Taiwan, and especially Japan and gathering and analyzing information related to senior officials in these and other countries. 
In June of the same year, Russell H. Siu (Jamestown Foundation) published a report entitled "Preliminary Survey of Chinese Communist Party Influence Operations in Japan."
In the report, Mr. Siu defines political warfare as "a set of overt or covert means used by a government to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of other governments and societies to achieve national objectives."
He states that the means by which the CCP is conducting malicious influence operations against Japan have not been clarified. 
He also states that it is necessary to investigate the agencies and methods of these operations and their potential effectiveness in influencing the Japanese government.
The CCP conducts influence operations through "united front work," which involves influencing, indoctrinating, and mobilizing people and organizations other than CCP members to achieve the party's goals.
The Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary Xi Jinping has focused on united front work and brought organizations to the fore with a united front orientation.
The main united front organization is the China Peace and Reunification Promotion Council, or the CCPPR, which is directly under the CCP's United Front Work Department.
The report mentions the names of some of the subordinate organizations active in Japan, including the All Japan Chinese People Promotion China Peace and Reunification Association, the All Japan Overseas Chinese and Chinese People China Peace and Reunification Promotion Association, and the Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese and Chinese People.
Under the guise of private exchange, these organizations are tasked with steering the domestic discussion in a direction favorable to the Chinese Communist Party by creating a united front among the Japanese people.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact, led by Yang Wanming, is an organization that conducts elite recruitment activities mainly through exchanges between high-level (elite) figures in Japan and China.
The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has a bureau dedicated to Japan-related activities.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), affiliated with the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, carries out influence operations through China's diplomatic, national security, united front, propaganda, and military channels.
In Japan, this organization interacts with various sectors of Japanese society, including religious groups, architects, calligraphy associations, and veterans, and guides United Front operations. 
The danger of the Confucius Institutes, known as the "Trojan Horse" of the Chinese Communist Party, has also been questioned.
There are 12 Confucius Institutes in Japan (Table 1).
In the United States, there are concerns about the Chinese embassy's interference in student groups, and the US Congress has restricted federal funding for schools that have accepted the establishment of Confucius Institutes.
The State Department has recognized the "US Center for Confucius Institutes" in Washington, which oversees Confucius Institutes across the United States, as an agency of the Chinese government.
According to the US General Accounting Office, the number of Confucius Institutes established within US universities has decreased from around 100 to less than five.
However, in Japan, we have only been able to confirm the closure of three schools.
What is the reason for not closing the Confucius Institutes, which are seen as a danger in the United States?

What are the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations"?
The Chinese government officially recognizes seven organizations as "Japan-China friendship organizations."
The Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, which we introduced at the beginning of this article, is included in this group, collectively called the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations."
・Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship (Chairman: Toshihiro Nika)
・Japan-China Friendship Association (Chairman: Tokuichiro Utsunomiya)
・Japan International Trade Promotion Association (Chairman: Yohei Kono)
・Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (Chairman: Senji Kuroi)
・Japan-China Economic Association (Chairman: Kosei Shindo)
・Japan-China Society (Chairman: Takeshi Noda)
・Japan-China Friendship Center (Chairman: Yuji Miyamoto)
Let's take a look at the seven chairpersons.
Toshihiro Nikai and Yohei Kono are well-known pro-China politicians.
Tokio Utsunomiya is the grandson of Tokuma Utsunomiya, a politician known for his pro-China stance.
Takeo Noda is also a member of the LDP and a former member of the House of Representatives.
Senji Kuroi is a novelist, and Yuji Miyamoto is a diplomat and former ambassador to China.
In the United States, the Republican and Democratic parties have reacted against Nippon Steel's acquisition of US Steel.
Some believe that the reason for this is the relationship between Nippon Steel and China.
In the aforementioned report, "China's Military Power," the DIAM pointed out that the Chinese government has been using seven Japan-China friendship groups to support its operations against Japan.
They are viewed with caution as organizations that have worked in unison with the Chinese Communist Party, which rules the authoritarian state of the People's Republic of China, to carry out united front work in our free and open country. In addition to these Chinese Communist Party front organizations, there are also local organizations in Japan that have ties to organizations that carry out political warfare in China. 
Still, we will not go into detail here due to space limitations.
If you approach these Chinese Communist Party front organizations carelessly, you may find yourself caught up in an irreversible situation.

Infiltrating the Japanese political world through pro-China politicians 
The infiltration of Japanese politics through pro-China politicians began in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China.
The "Japan-China Trade Promotion Parliamentary League" (Chu-Nichi Girei), the predecessor of the Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, played an important role.
The Chu-Nichi Girei had close ties with the "Democratic Defense League," the largest post-war united front organization.
Ryoichiro Miyazaki and others who worked in the secretariat of the Democratic Defense League had belonged to Fumimaro Konoe's Showa Kenkyukai (Society for the Study of the Showa Period) together with Hidemitsu Ozaki, who was a Soviet spy before the war.
After the war, they proposed to Kei Hashiashi, who was busy establishing the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, that they "link the activities of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association with the Diet to ease the embargo on trade with China and restrictions on travel to China."
In May 1949, the Japan-China Parliamentary League was established.
At the time, Japan was under the occupation of GHQ.
Companies were looking for ways to get out of the post-war recession.
Companies could not break free from the trade experience between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China before the war, and they lacked awareness of the risks of trade with communist countries.
They could not ignore the actions of the companies that were their support base, and not only left-wing politicians but also conservative politicians joined the Japan-China Parliamentary League.
The Japan-China Parliamentary League strengthened its influence in the Diet by incorporating conservative politicians and connecting the government with related organizations.
The Chinese government, which focused on gaining the support of the Japanese people through anti-American protests, began to value the Japan-China Parliamentary League by lobbying the Japanese government and lifting restrictions on Japan-China trade.
This article continues.


2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka

What are the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations"?

2024年10月08日 15時19分44秒 | 全般
The following is an excerpt from an article by economic security analyst Koji Hirai, which appeared in the monthly magazine WiLL on September 26 in a three-column format on pages 98 to 105.
This article also proves that he is one of the national treasures defined by Saicho.
It is a must-read not only for Japanese citizens but also for people worldwide.

Airspace and territorial waters violations, seven organizations for Japan-China friendship, Japan-China friendship parliamentary group...
Why not create a counterespionage law?
We don't need a "pipeline to China" that just sucks us in unilaterally.

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?
A Y9 intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army violated Japanese airspace near the Nagasaki Prefecture Goto Islands for about two minutes (August 26).
The following day, the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League, which had visited China, met with Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China.
They expressed their regret at the violation of Japanese airspace by the People's Liberation Army and called for a recurrence to be prevented, but that was all.
At this meeting, it was decided to strengthen exchanges between Japan and China and continue dialogue. 
The delegation returned home without making any claims based on Japan's national interests.
In political warfare, it is essential to spread political propaganda.
China targets the political elite of the country it is targeting.
It is because they are in a position to exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. 
China's political warfare is said to go beyond the three battles (public opinion, media, psychological, and legal battles) and united front work and to be carried out by combining soft power functions such as disinformation and overt and covert media manipulation with state functions such as espionage and violent operations.
Because it is carried out below the surface, it is the most difficult to analyze and discover, and there is no publicly known information.
What is public opinion and media warfare?
Propaganda is disseminated to the people of the target country through terrestrial broadcasting, online programming, video apps, movies, books, etc.
The aim is to influence public opinion. The major Japanese media reported on the incursion above into Japanese airspace in a way that gave the impression that it was a "careless mistake" by the People's Liberation Army, with headlines such as "Chinese military aircraft violates airspace, Ministry of Defense confirms for the first time, government lodges stern protest."
However, the aim was to gather information.
When foreign military aircraft violate Japanese airspace, radar sites scattered around Kyushu emit radio waves such as radar frequencies.
By having information-gathering aircraft violate Japanese airspace, the Chinese military attempted to intercept and gather information that their uncrewed aerial vehicles could not.
This information would then be analyzed, and the signal data would be loaded into the fighter jets' detection radar and anti-radar missiles, which would then be used to attack the radar of Japanese and American bases.
Why didn't the Japanese media report this fact to the public? The strategy of a united front is one of the "magic weapons" that will be used to achieve Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream."
It suggests that China's infiltration work, public opinion war, and media war are reaching deep into our country.

A Covert Organization Eroding Japan:
In January 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a report titled "China's Military Power."
The report revealed that the Political Department Liaison Bureau, which is part of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, is conducting "political warfare" against the US, Taiwan, and especially Japan and gathering and analyzing information related to senior officials in these and other countries. 
In June of the same year, Russell H. Siu (Jamestown Foundation) published a report entitled "Preliminary Survey of Chinese Communist Party Influence Operations in Japan."
In the report, Mr. Siu defines political warfare as "a set of overt or covert means used by a government to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of other governments and societies to achieve national objectives."
He states that the means by which the CCP is conducting malicious influence operations against Japan have not been clarified. 
He also states that it is necessary to investigate the agencies and methods of these operations and their potential effectiveness in influencing the Japanese government.
The CCP conducts influence operations through "united front work," which involves influencing, indoctrinating, and mobilizing people and organizations other than CCP members to achieve the party's goals.
The Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary Xi Jinping has focused on united front work and brought organizations to the fore with a united front orientation.
The main united front organization is the China Peace and Reunification Promotion Council, or the CCPPR, which is directly under the CCP's United Front Work Department.
The report mentions the names of some of the subordinate organizations active in Japan, including the All Japan Chinese People Promotion China Peace and Reunification Association, the All Japan Overseas Chinese and Chinese People China Peace and Reunification Promotion Association, and the Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese and Chinese People.
Under the guise of private exchange, these organizations are tasked with steering the domestic discussion in a direction favorable to the Chinese Communist Party by creating a united front among the Japanese people.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact, led by Yang Wanming, is an organization that conducts elite recruitment activities mainly through exchanges between high-level (elite) figures in Japan and China.
The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has a bureau dedicated to Japan-related activities.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), affiliated with the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, carries out influence operations through China's diplomatic, national security, united front, propaganda, and military channels.
In Japan, this organization interacts with various sectors of Japanese society, including religious groups, architects, calligraphy associations, and veterans, and guides United Front operations. 
The danger of the Confucius Institutes, known as the "Trojan Horse" of the Chinese Communist Party, has also been questioned.
There are 12 Confucius Institutes in Japan (Table 1).
In the United States, there are concerns about the Chinese embassy's interference in student groups, and the US Congress has restricted federal funding for schools that have accepted the establishment of Confucius Institutes.
The State Department has recognized the "US Center for Confucius Institutes" in Washington, which oversees Confucius Institutes across the United States, as an agency of the Chinese government.
According to the US General Accounting Office, the number of Confucius Institutes established within US universities has decreased from around 100 to less than five.
However, in Japan, we have only been able to confirm the closure of three schools.
What is the reason for not closing the Confucius Institutes, which are seen as a danger in the United States?

What are the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations"?
The Chinese government officially recognizes seven organizations as "Japan-China friendship organizations."
The Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship, which we introduced at the beginning of this article, is included in this group, collectively called the "Seven Japan-China Friendship Organizations."
・Japan-China Parliamentary League of Friendship (Chairman: Toshihiro Nika)
・Japan-China Friendship Association (Chairman: Tokuichiro Utsunomiya)
・Japan International Trade Promotion Association (Chairman: Yohei Kono)
・Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (Chairman: Senji Kuroi)
・Japan-China Economic Association (Chairman: Kosei Shindo)
・Japan-China Society (Chairman: Takeshi Noda)
・Japan-China Friendship Center (Chairman: Yuji Miyamoto)
Let's take a look at the seven chairpersons.
Toshihiro Nikai and Yohei Kono are well-known pro-China politicians.
Tokio Utsunomiya is the grandson of Tokuma Utsunomiya, a politician known for his pro-China stance.
Takeo Noda is also a member of the LDP and a former member of the House of Representatives.
Senji Kuroi is a novelist, and Yuji Miyamoto is a diplomat and former ambassador to China.
In the United States, the Republican and Democratic parties have reacted against Nippon Steel's acquisition of US Steel.
Some believe that the reason for this is the relationship between Nippon Steel and China.
In the aforementioned report, "China's Military Power," the DIAM pointed out that the Chinese government has been using seven Japan-China friendship groups to support its operations against Japan.
They are viewed with caution as organizations that have worked in unison with the Chinese Communist Party, which rules the authoritarian state of the People's Republic of China, to carry out united front work in our free and open country. In addition to these Chinese Communist Party front organizations, there are also local organizations in Japan that have ties to organizations that carry out political warfare in China. 
Still, we will not go into detail here due to space limitations.
If you approach these Chinese Communist Party front organizations carelessly, you may find yourself caught up in an irreversible situation.
This article continues.


2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka

What is the reason for not closing the Confucius Institutes,

2024年10月08日 15時13分53秒 | 全般
The following is an excerpt from an article by economic security analyst Koji Hirai, which appeared in the monthly magazine WiLL on September 26 in a three-column format on pages 98 to 105.
This article also proves that he is one of the national treasures defined by Saicho.
It is a must-read not only for Japanese citizens but also for people worldwide.

Airspace and territorial waters violations, seven organizations for Japan-China friendship, Japan-China friendship parliamentary group...
Why not create a counterespionage law?
We don't need a "pipeline to China" that just sucks us in unilaterally.

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?
A Y9 intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army violated Japanese airspace near the Nagasaki Prefecture Goto Islands for about two minutes (August 26).
The following day, the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League, which had visited China, met with Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China.
They expressed their regret at the violation of Japanese airspace by the People's Liberation Army and called for a recurrence to be prevented, but that was all.
At this meeting, it was decided to strengthen exchanges between Japan and China and continue dialogue. 
The delegation returned home without making any claims based on Japan's national interests.
In political warfare, it is essential to spread political propaganda.
China targets the political elite of the country it is targeting.
It is because they are in a position to exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. 
China's political warfare is said to go beyond the three battles (public opinion, media, psychological, and legal battles) and united front work and to be carried out by combining soft power functions such as disinformation and overt and covert media manipulation with state functions such as espionage and violent operations.
Because it is carried out below the surface, it is the most difficult to analyze and discover, and there is no publicly known information.
What is public opinion and media warfare?
Propaganda is disseminated to the people of the target country through terrestrial broadcasting, online programming, video apps, movies, books, etc.
The aim is to influence public opinion. The major Japanese media reported on the incursion above into Japanese airspace in a way that gave the impression that it was a "careless mistake" by the People's Liberation Army, with headlines such as "Chinese military aircraft violates airspace, Ministry of Defense confirms for the first time, government lodges stern protest."
However, the aim was to gather information.
When foreign military aircraft violate Japanese airspace, radar sites scattered around Kyushu emit radio waves such as radar frequencies.
By having information-gathering aircraft violate Japanese airspace, the Chinese military attempted to intercept and gather information that their uncrewed aerial vehicles could not.
This information would then be analyzed, and the signal data would be loaded into the fighter jets' detection radar and anti-radar missiles, which would then be used to attack the radar of Japanese and American bases.
Why didn't the Japanese media report this fact to the public? The strategy of a united front is one of the "magic weapons" that will be used to achieve Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream."
It suggests that China's infiltration work, public opinion war, and media war are reaching deep into our country.

A Covert Organization Eroding Japan:
In January 2019, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published a report titled "China's Military Power."
The report revealed that the Political Department Liaison Bureau, which is part of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, is conducting "political warfare" against the US, Taiwan, and especially Japan and gathering and analyzing information related to senior officials in these and other countries. 
In June of the same year, Russell H. Siu (Jamestown Foundation) published a report entitled "Preliminary Survey of Chinese Communist Party Influence Operations in Japan."
In the report, Mr. Siu defines political warfare as "a set of overt or covert means used by a government to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of other governments and societies to achieve national objectives."
He states that the means by which the CCP is conducting malicious influence operations against Japan have not been clarified. 
He also states that it is necessary to investigate the agencies and methods of these operations and their potential effectiveness in influencing the Japanese government.
The CCP conducts influence operations through "united front work," which involves influencing, indoctrinating, and mobilizing people and organizations other than CCP members to achieve the party's goals.
The Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary Xi Jinping has focused on united front work and brought organizations to the fore with a united front orientation.
The main united front organization is the China Peace and Reunification Promotion Council, or the CCPPR, which is directly under the CCP's United Front Work Department.
The report mentions the names of some of the subordinate organizations active in Japan, including the All Japan Chinese People Promotion China Peace and Reunification Association, the All Japan Overseas Chinese and Chinese People China Peace and Reunification Promotion Association, and the Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese and Chinese People.
Under the guise of private exchange, these organizations are tasked with steering the domestic discussion in a direction favorable to the Chinese Communist Party by creating a united front among the Japanese people.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact, led by Yang Wanming, is an organization that conducts elite recruitment activities mainly through exchanges between high-level (elite) figures in Japan and China.
The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has a bureau dedicated to Japan-related activities.
The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), affiliated with the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, carries out influence operations through China's diplomatic, national security, united front, propaganda, and military channels.
In Japan, this organization interacts with various sectors of Japanese society, including religious groups, architects, calligraphy associations, and veterans, and guides United Front operations. 
The danger of the Confucius Institutes, known as the "Trojan Horse" of the Chinese Communist Party, has also been questioned.
There are 12 Confucius Institutes in Japan (Table 1).
In the United States, there are concerns about the Chinese embassy's interference in student groups, and the US Congress has restricted federal funding for schools that have accepted the establishment of Confucius Institutes.
The State Department has recognized the "US Center for Confucius Institutes" in Washington, which oversees Confucius Institutes across the United States, as an agency of the Chinese government.
According to the US General Accounting Office, the number of Confucius Institutes established within US universities has decreased from around 100 to less than five.
However, in Japan, we have only been able to confirm the closure of three schools.
What is the reason for not closing the Confucius Institutes, which are seen as a danger in the United States?
This article continues.


2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?

2024年10月08日 15時02分20秒 | 全般
The following is an excerpt from an article by economic security analyst Koji Hirai, which appeared in the monthly magazine WiLL on September 26 in a three-column format on pages 98 to 105.
This article also proves that he is one of the national treasures defined by Saicho.
It is a must-read not only for Japanese citizens but also for people worldwide.

Airspace and territorial waters violations, seven organizations for Japan-China friendship, Japan-China friendship parliamentary group...
Why not create a counterespionage law?
We don't need a "pipeline to China" that just sucks us in unilaterally.

What is the "true purpose" of airspace violations?
A Y9 intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army violated Japanese airspace near the Nagasaki Prefecture Goto Islands for about two minutes (August 26).
The following day, the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League, which had visited China, met with Zhao Leji, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China.
They expressed their regret at the violation of Japanese airspace by the People's Liberation Army and called for a recurrence to be prevented, but that was all.
At this meeting, it was decided to strengthen exchanges between Japan and China and continue dialogue. 
The delegation returned home without making any claims based on Japan's national interests.
In political warfare, it is essential to spread political propaganda.
China targets the political elite of the country it is targeting.
It is because they are in a position to exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. 
China's political warfare is said to go beyond the three battles (public opinion, media, psychological, and legal battles) and united front work and to be carried out by combining soft power functions such as disinformation and overt and covert media manipulation with state functions such as espionage and violent operations.
Because it is carried out below the surface, it is the most difficult to analyze and discover, and there is no publicly known information.
What is public opinion and media warfare?
Propaganda is disseminated to the people of the target country through terrestrial broadcasting, online programming, video apps, movies, books, etc.
The aim is to influence public opinion. The major Japanese media reported on the incursion above into Japanese airspace in a way that gave the impression that it was a "careless mistake" by the People's Liberation Army, with headlines such as "Chinese military aircraft violates airspace, Ministry of Defense confirms for the first time, government lodges stern protest."
However, the aim was to gather information.
When foreign military aircraft violate Japanese airspace, radar sites scattered around Kyushu emit radio waves such as radar frequencies.
By having information-gathering aircraft violate Japanese airspace, the Chinese military attempted to intercept and gather information that their unmanned aerial vehicles could not.
This information would then be analyzed, and the signal data would be loaded into the fighter jets' detection radar and anti-radar missiles, which would then be used to attack the radar of Japanese and American bases.
Why didn't the Japanese media report this fact to the public? The strategy of a united front is one of the "magic weapons" that will be used to achieve Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream."
It suggests that China's infiltration work, public opinion war, and media war are reaching deep into our country.
This article continues.


2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka

Estão a aproveitar-se da fragilidade da democracia.

2024年10月08日 14時59分04秒 | 全般

O texto que se segue foi retirado da edição de novembro da revista mensal WiLL, lançada a 26 de setembro.
Trata-se de uma leitura obrigatória não só para os cidadãos japoneses, mas também para os cidadãos de todo o mundo.
Terá a China manipulado Shigeru Ishiba?
Rui Sasaki, jornalista, professor da Faculdade de Estudos Internacionais da Universidade de Reitaku
A sombra da China por detrás da “superioridade esmagadora” que tem andado a circular em Nagatacho
Candidatos cheios de sentimentos pró-China e pró-China 
O verdadeiro cérebro por detrás da eleição presidencial do LDP foi o Partido Comunista Chinês.
Como é que o Japão deve lidar com uma China que se comporta de forma arrogante em todo o mundo e usa a pressão militar e económica para forçar o Japão a uma posição subordinada?
Este ponto ainda não foi objeto de um questionamento rigoroso no momento em que escrevo.
Se a eleição presidencial do LDP, que é, de facto, uma escolha de primeiro-ministro, fechar a cortina como está, deixará um mau legado para o futuro.
A China continuará provavelmente a utilizar os membros do LDP que se candidataram à presidência e ganharam algum prestígio para reforçar os seus planos de divulgação de informação e de orientação de benefícios a seu favor nos bastidores.
Temos de prestar ainda mais atenção às palavras e acções dos deputados do LDP que se candidatam à presidência do que no passado.
Analisei os candidatos, com exceção da Sra. Takaichi Sanae.
A eleição presidencial foi dominada por políticos pró-China.
A empresa familiar do Ministro de Estado para a Política Digital, Taro Kono, Nihon Terminal (sede: cidade de Hiratsuka, Prefeitura de Kanagawa; presidente: Jiro Kono), tem laços estreitos com empresas chinesas.
Descobriu-se também que o logótipo de uma empresa chinesa foi anexado aos materiais de um painel de peritos do Gabinete do Governo que discutia as energias renováveis.
Algumas pessoas sussurraram que a medida visava direcionar os lucros para a Nihon Terminal.
A preocupação de que “os negócios da família estão a ser prioritários em relação aos interesses nacionais” (deputado do LDP) não foi dissipada nem mesmo durante as eleições presidenciais. 
Enquanto Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Kono visitou a China no final de janeiro de 2018.
Tirou uma fotografia com a porta-voz chinesa Hua Chunying, que é de categoria inferior, e publicou-a na sua conta do Twitter, parecendo estar satisfeito consigo próprio. 
Se Kono é o Yokozuna (grande campeão) da fação pró-China no Ocidente, então o Secretário-Chefe do Gabinete, Yoshimasa Hayashi, que é o antigo presidente da Liga de Amizade Japão-China e que se autodenomina uma “fação amiga da China” e é o supervisor geral do comércio Japão-China, é o Yokozuna do Oriente. 
Numa conferência de imprensa, Hayashi afirmou que, se se tornar primeiro-ministro e presidente do LDP, organizará uma reunião dos ministros competentes para analisar as medidas a tomar em relação às bóias marítimas que a China instalou na zona económica exclusiva (ZEE) do Japão em torno das ilhas Senkaku (cidade de Ishigaki, província de Okinawa).
É o mesmo que dizer que não as estão a retirar por consideração à China.
Como primeiro-ministro, deveria simplesmente ordenar a sua remoção.
É um mau exemplo de como uma pessoa pode tornar-se tão corrupta que é recebida com entusiasmo sempre que visita a China.
Quando o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês, Wang Yi, visitou o Japão em novembro de 2020, afirmou numa conferência de imprensa conjunta após a reunião dos Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros Japão-China que “as Ilhas Senkaku são território chinês”.
Ainda assim, o Secretário-Geral Toshimitsu Motegi respondeu com “Shei, Shei” sem o refutar.
Além disso, proferiu palavras de gratidão que pareciam implicar que venderia as Ilhas Senkaku.
Foi exposto como inapto tanto para primeiro-ministro como para presidente do LDP.
Nessa altura, deveria ter percebido que já não tinha qualificações para ser primeiro-ministro e presidente do LDP. 
Os apoiantes de Shigeru Ishiba incluem muitas figuras pró-China.
Entre os que o recomendaram, Taira Masaaki, membro da Câmara dos Representantes, é vice-presidente da Associação para o Desenvolvimento Japão-China (Presidente Kono Taro), uma associação geral dedicada à promoção do intercâmbio entre pequenas e médias empresas do Japão e da China.

Foram divulgadas informações falsas em Nagatacho:
No caso do Sr. Ishiba, havia suspeitas de que estava a ser utilizado como peão pela parte chinesa.
Era a noite anterior ao início oficial das eleições presidenciais.
De acordo com fontes fidedignas, os resultados de uma sondagem de opinião pública realizada pela sede do LDP a 8 de setembro junto dos membros do partido foram divulgados em Nagatacho e Kasumigaseki. 
A sondagem terá sido efectuada junto de 2 162 pessoas, num universo de 1 milhão de membros e apoiantes do partido, e os resultados foram os seguintes

  • 34,9% para o Sr. Ishiba
  • 23,2% para o antigo Ministro do Ambiente, Sr. Koizumi
  • 15,9% para a Ministra de Estado da Política Económica e de Segurança, Sanae Takaichi

É evidente que os resultados não são naturais.
Os números mostram que o Sr. Ishiba está a ganhar esmagadoramente aos outros candidatos.
A diferença entre o Sr. Koizumi, que está em segundo lugar, e a Sra. Takaichi, que está em terceiro lugar, é também tão grande que parece impossível de recuperar. 
Se a Sra. Takaichi conseguisse chegar ao segundo lugar, havia a possibilidade de uma reviravolta na votação final.
Ainda assim, estes números transmitem a mensagem de que “Ishiba e Koizumi são os que vão terminar em primeiro e segundo lugar, e não há hipótese de a Sra. Takaichi passar à votação final, por isso devem mudar para o cavalo vencedor e desistir do vosso apoio à Sra. Takaichi”. 
No passado, a sede do LDP nunca realizou uma sondagem de opinião pública para as eleições presidenciais, a fim de garantir a equidade.
O autor também cobriu as eleições presidenciais durante muitos anos na arena política, mas nunca ouviu falar disso.
O pano de fundo para o aparecimento de informações falsas e sem fundamento no dia anterior ao anúncio oficial, que também foi desmentido pelo chefe do comité de gestão eleitoral do LDP, foi o facto de se pensar que “uma grande força em ação” (de acordo com pessoas próximas do vice-primeiro-ministro Taro Aso) estava a tentar tomar a iniciativa na eleição para a liderança e criar uma tendência a favor do Sr. Ishiba. 
Este nível de desinformação é uma ideia que até um novato no mundo das eleições poderia ter.
O que é preciso ter em atenção é o poder de disseminação e de atração.
Só um número limitado de forças pode disseminar a informação por todo o mundo político, burocrático e empresarial, ao ponto de aqueles que recebem a desinformação acabarem por acreditar nela.
Recebi desinformação de várias pessoas envolvidas no assunto. 
A primeira coisa que me vem à cabeça são os media.
Se os destinatários finais das informações falsas são os consumidores, é como um retalhista que recebe as mercadorias dos produtores através dos grossistas e depois as entrega aos consumidores.
Então, quem é o cérebro por detrás da produção de desinformação, o grossista da desinformação para o intermediário?
O campo do Sr. Ishiba não é a fonte da desinformação.
Não fariam algo tão astuto e não têm poder para o fazer.
A existência do Departamento Central de Trabalho da Frente Unida do Partido Comunista Chinês (Departamento da Frente Unida) está escondida no fundo.
É que até um conhecido meu chinês, que está bem informado sobre as actividades do Partido Comunista Chinês no Japão, obteve esta desinformação da comunidade chinesa em Tóquio na noite do dia 11.
Mesmo para as autoridades de segurança pública japonesas, é preciso tempo para identificar imediatamente a fonte de desinformação.
É como tentar encontrar o primeiro doente de coronavírus em Wuhan, na China.
O Gabinete de Informações e Investigação do Governo está em alerta máximo relativamente à guerra de informação do Governo chinês, incluindo a divulgação de informações falsas.
Estamos a trabalhar arduamente para descobrir a origem e o objetivo desta situação”, afirmou outro funcionário da segurança pública. Temos de estar conscientes do facto de estarem a circular informações falsas na comunidade chinesa em Tóquio, que é constituída por chineses que vivem no Japão e por chineses no estrangeiro”.

Os chineses no estrangeiro e os cidadãos chineses são membros do LDP.
O facto de os candidatos a presidente serem todos pró-China ou pró-China é um problema, mas o que é mais grave é que continua a existir a preocupação com a “personificação” de cidadãos chineses (cidadãos chineses que vivem no Japão e que adquiriram a nacionalidade japonesa) e de chineses ultramarinos (cidadãos chineses que vivem no Japão) por membros do LDP e amigos do partido que têm direito de voto nas eleições presidenciais. 
O LDP estipula que a adesão está aberta a “pessoas com idade igual ou superior a 18 anos e de nacionalidade japonesa”.
No entanto, na realidade, na maioria dos casos, nem sequer pedem a identificação.
Um conhecido do partido provincial do LDP confidenciou-me: “Nem sequer pedem uma cópia do registo de família ou um passaporte ou verificam o jornal oficial, por isso é quase como se não houvesse qualquer verificação”.
O facto de ser a pessoa que é apresentada, e não a pessoa, a realizar o processo de candidatura a membro também contribui para a falta de transparência em torno da filiação partidária.
Mesmo os membros do parlamento raramente revelam a sua nacionalidade ou antecedentes, e é um segredo aberto que há um número considerável de cidadãos japoneses naturalizados no LDP e nos partidos da oposição.
Pensa-se que muitos membros naturalizados do LDP poderão ser forçados a seguir as instruções de Pequim em caso de crise em Taiwan, etc., através de intimidação ou de uma estratégia de abrandamento.
Será que a tentativa de simplificar os procedimentos administrativos para alargar rapidamente o número de membros do partido se revelou um tiro pela culatra?
Mesmo entre os chineses que adquiriram a nacionalidade japonesa, muitos “têm o coração na China”.
É de notar que, tal como a espia chinesa em Nova Iorque apresentou na última parte deste artigo, muitas pessoas que se naturalizaram no país para onde imigraram continuam a ter a mentalidade de seguir as ordens de Pequim e de permanecer leais à sua pátria.

Os patrocinadores dos “bilhetes do partido” são cidadãos chineses.
Para além de se fazerem passar por membros do partido, os cidadãos chineses também compraram bilhetes para o partido (bilhetes para o partido) para os partidos da fação do Partido Liberal Democrático.
Os Kouchikai, a que Fumio Kishida pertencia, realizaram uma festa de angariação de fundos políticos denominada “Kouchikai and Talk” em maio de 2019, 2022 e 2023, e descobriu-se através de vídeos e outros meios de comunicação social afiliados à China que muitos chineses
grupos e indivíduos chineses participaram no evento, como mostram os vídeos e outros meios de comunicação social afiliados à China.
De acordo com estas fontes, os grupos chineses foram os principais patrocinadores do evento, que custou 20 000 ienes por pessoa.
Não é possível que um grupo ou indivíduo chinês seja tão excêntrico ao ponto de dar dinheiro e não palavras.
De facto, a representante de um grupo chinês de Nagoya subiu ao palco para fazer um discurso.
Neste momento, estava simplesmente a promover a sua empresa.
No entanto, não há garantias de que o lado chinês, que se tornou um patrocinador de alto valor da fação do LDP, não exerça pressão sobre o Japão para que as situações se desenvolvam de uma forma conveniente para a China em questões que abalam as fundações do país, como a política externa e a política de segurança do Japão. 
Por outras palavras, não é surpreendente que a China possa estar a planear fazer com que Mogi diga “shei, shei” (sim, sim) de acordo com os desejos da China em questões como as ilhas Senkaku, que a China designa por “questões sensíveis”.
Relativamente aos bilhetes para os partidos, o limiar para a divulgação dos compradores foi reduzido de mais de 200 000 ienes para mais de 50 000 ienes, na sequência da questão do “fundo falso” que envolveu a fação do LDP, mas não é esse o problema. A lei atual tem dois pesos e duas medidas, na medida em que é ilegal os estrangeiros fazerem donativos, mas não há problema em comprarem bilhetes para o partido.
Tornou-se um foco de financiamento por parte de potências estrangeiras.
A Lei de Controlo dos Fundos Políticos proíbe os donativos de estrangeiros e de empresas estrangeiras, na perspetiva de impedir a influência estrangeira na política.
Assim, a compra de bilhetes para os partidos por estrangeiros também deveria ser ilegal.

Estão a aproveitar-se da fragilidade da democracia.
O que quero sublinhar é que devemos estar atentos à intervenção direta e indireta na próxima dissolução da Câmara dos Representantes e nas eleições gerais, através da utilização pela China das redes sociais e da desinformação numa campanha de guerra cognitiva, bem como da subversão psicológica com recurso à força militar e a outros meios.
É o modus operandi dos Estados totalitários atacar os pontos fracos dos países democráticos.
Esta estratégia põe em prática a estratégia de Sun Tzu “Tomar a iniciativa” (Jun Shu Qian Yang).
Se conseguirmos encontrar a mais pequena abertura, devemos explorá-la em nosso benefício.
Durante períodos de transição de poder, países autoritários como a China e a Rússia tentarão quase de certeza tirar partido da situação de alguma forma. 
Em 26 de agosto, um importante avião militar chinês, que estava a recolher informações, violou pela primeira vez o espaço aéreo das ilhas Goto da prefeitura de Nagasaki.
Em 19 de agosto, um cidadão chinês sequestrou a emissora pública NHK, proferindo disparates como “as ilhas Senkaku são território chinês. Não se esqueçam do Massacre de Nanquim. Não se esqueçam das mulheres de conforto”.
O homem que escreveu um graffiti no Santuário Yasukuni também pode regressar ao Japão em segurança.
A 18 de setembro, um rapaz japonês foi esfaqueado até à morte em Fukagawa, na China.
Foi o dia em que eclodiu o Incidente da Manchúria e é possível que se tenha tratado de uma manifestação de ódio contra os japoneses, numa altura em que as autoridades chinesas promoviam o sentimento anti-japonês.
Tudo isto aconteceu ao mesmo tempo que as eleições presidenciais do Partido Liberal Democrático, que estavam ao rubro depois de Fumio Kishida ter anunciado que não iria concorrer às eleições.
A Rússia também abalou o lado japonês, no início de setembro deste ano, ao enviar a informação de que o Presidente Putin iria fazer uma aterragem forçada nos Territórios do Norte, depois de visitar a Mongólia.
Este artigo continua.

2024/10/6 in Umeda

Ils profitent de la fragilité de la démocratie.

2024年10月08日 14時57分29秒 | 全般

Le texte qui suit est extrait du numéro de novembre du magazine mensuel WiLL, publié le 26 septembre.
Il s'agit d'un article à lire absolument, non seulement pour les citoyens japonais, mais aussi pour le monde entier.
La Chine a-t-elle manipulé Shigeru Ishiba ?
Rui Sasaki, journaliste, professeur à la faculté d'études internationales de l'université Reitaku
L'ombre de la Chine derrière la « supériorité écrasante » qui circule à Nagatacho
Des candidats pleins de sentiments pro-Chine et pro-chinois 
Le véritable cerveau de l'élection présidentielle du PLD est le parti communiste chinois.
Comment le Japon doit-il traiter avec une Chine qui se comporte de manière arrogante dans le monde entier et qui utilise la pression militaire et économique pour contraindre le Japon à une position subordonnée ?
Ce point n'a pas encore été rigoureusement remis en question à l'heure où nous écrivons ces lignes.
Si l'élection présidentielle du PLD, qui est en fait un choix de premier ministre, se termine en l'état, elle laissera un mauvais héritage pour l'avenir.
La Chine continuera probablement à utiliser les membres du PLD qui se sont présentés à la présidence et qui ont acquis un certain prestige pour renforcer ses projets de diffusion d'informations et d'orientation des avantages en sa faveur dans les coulisses.
Nous devons prêter une attention encore plus grande que par le passé aux paroles et aux actions des législateurs du PLD qui se présentent à la présidence.
J'ai examiné les candidats, à l'exception de Mme Takaichi Sanae.
L'élection présidentielle a été dominée par des politiciens pro-Chine.
L'entreprise familiale de Taro Kono, ministre d'État chargé de la politique numérique, Nihon Terminal (siège : ville de Hiratsuka, préfecture de Kanagawa ; président : Jiro Kono), entretient des liens étroits avec des entreprises chinoises.
On a également découvert que le logo d'une entreprise chinoise était apposé sur les documents d'un groupe d'experts du bureau du cabinet chargé d'examiner la question des énergies renouvelables.
Certaines personnes ont murmuré que cette initiative visait à diriger les profits vers Nihon Terminal.
L'inquiétude selon laquelle « l'entreprise familiale est prioritaire par rapport aux intérêts nationaux » (membre du parlement du PLD) n'a pas été dissipée, même après l'élection présidentielle. 
En tant que ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Kono s'est rendu en Chine fin janvier 2018.
Il a pris une photo avec la porte-parole chinoise Hua Chunying, qui est d'un rang inférieur, et l'a postée sur son compte Twitter, semblant satisfait de lui-même. 
Si M. Kono est le Yokozuna (grand champion) de la faction pro-Chine en Occident, le secrétaire général du cabinet, M. Yoshimasa Hayashi, qui est l'ancien président de la Ligue d'amitié Japon-Chine, qui se qualifie lui-même de « faction favorable à la Chine » et qui est le superviseur général du commerce entre le Japon et la Chine, est le Yokozuna de l'Orient. 
Lors d'une conférence de presse, M. Hayashi a déclaré que s'il devenait premier ministre et président du PLD, il organiserait une réunion des ministres concernés afin d'examiner les mesures à prendre concernant les bouées maritimes installées par la Chine dans la zone économique exclusive (ZEE) du Japon autour des îles Senkaku (ville d'Ishigaki, préfecture d'Okinawa).
Cela revient à dire qu'ils ne les enlèvent pas par égard pour la Chine.
En tant que premier ministre, il devrait simplement ordonner leur retrait.
C'est un mauvais exemple de la façon dont une personne peut devenir si corrompue qu'elle est accueillie avec enthousiasme chaque fois qu'elle se rend en Chine.
Lorsque le ministre chinois des affaires étrangères Wang Yi s'est rendu au Japon en novembre 2020, il a déclaré lors d'une conférence de presse conjointe après la réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères Japon-Chine que « les îles Senkaku sont un territoire chinois ».
Le secrétaire général Toshimitsu Motegi a tout de même répondu par « Shei, Shei » sans le réfuter.
De plus, il a prononcé des mots de gratitude qui semblaient impliquer qu'il vendrait les îles Senkaku.
Il s'est révélé inapte à occuper les fonctions de premier ministre et de président du PLD.
À ce moment-là, il aurait dû se rendre compte qu'il n'avait plus les qualifications requises pour être premier ministre et président du PLD. 
Parmi les partisans de Shigeru Ishiba figurent de nombreuses personnalités favorables à la Chine.
Parmi ceux qui l'ont recommandé, Taira Masaaki, membre de la Chambre des représentants, est vice-président de l'Association pour le développement Japon-Chine (président Kono Taro), une association générale consacrée à la promotion des échanges entre les petites et moyennes entreprises au Japon et en Chine.

De fausses informations ont été diffusées autour de Nagatacho :
Dans le cas de M. Ishiba, on soupçonnait qu'il était utilisé comme un pion par la partie chinoise.
C'était la nuit précédant le début officiel de l'élection présidentielle.
Selon des sources fiables, les résultats d'un sondage d'opinion réalisé le 8 septembre par le siège du PLD auprès des membres du parti ont été diffusés autour de Nagatacho et de Kasumigaseki. 
L'enquête aurait été menée auprès de 2 162 personnes sur le million de membres et de sympathisants du parti, et les résultats sont les suivants :

  • 34,9 % pour M. Ishiba
  • 23,2% pour l'ancien ministre de l'environnement, M. Koizumi
  • 15,9 % pour le ministre d'État chargé de la politique économique et de sécurité, Mme Sanae Takaichi.

Il est clair que les résultats ne sont pas naturels.
En effet, les chiffres montrent que M. Ishiba est largement en tête par rapport aux autres candidats.
L'écart entre M. Koizumi, qui est en deuxième position, et Mme Takaichi, qui est en troisième position, est également si important qu'il semble impossible à combler. 
Si Mme Takaichi parvenait à se hisser à la deuxième place, le vote final pourrait s'inverser.
Néanmoins, ces chiffres transmettent le message suivant : « Ishiba et Koizumi sont ceux qui finiront premier et deuxième, et il n'y a aucune chance pour Mme Takaichi d'accéder au vote final, vous devez donc vous rallier au cheval gagnant et abandonner votre soutien à Mme Takaichi ». 
Par le passé, le siège du PLD n'a jamais réalisé de sondage d'opinion pour l'élection présidentielle afin de garantir l'équité.
L'auteur a également couvert l'élection présidentielle pendant de nombreuses années dans l'arène politique, mais n'en a jamais entendu parler.
L'apparition de fausses informations sans fondement la veille de l'annonce officielle, qui a également été démentie par le chef du comité de gestion des élections du PLD, s'explique par le fait que l'on pensait qu'une « grande force était à l'œuvre » (selon des personnes proches du vice-premier ministre Taro Aso) pour tenter de prendre l'initiative dans l'élection à la direction du parti et de créer une tendance en faveur de M. Ishiba. 
Ce niveau de désinformation est une idée que même un novice dans le monde des élections pourrait avoir.
Ce qu'il faut noter, c'est le pouvoir de diffusion et d'attraction.
Seul un nombre limité de forces peut diffuser largement l'information dans le monde politique, bureaucratique et des affaires au point que ceux qui reçoivent la désinformation finissent par y croire.
J'ai été désinformé par plusieurs personnes impliquées dans le dossier. 
La première chose qui me vient à l'esprit, ce sont les médias.
Si les destinataires finaux des fausses informations sont les consommateurs, c'est comme un détaillant qui reçoit des marchandises des producteurs par l'intermédiaire de grossistes et les livre ensuite aux consommateurs.
Alors, qui est le cerveau de la production de désinformation, le grossiste de la désinformation à l'intermédiaire ?
Le camp de M. Ishiba n'est pas la source de la désinformation.
Ils ne feraient pas quelque chose d'aussi rusé, et ils n'ont pas le pouvoir de le faire.
L'existence du Département central de travail du Front uni du Parti communiste chinois (Département du Front uni) se cache dans l'ombre.
C'est parce que même une de mes connaissances chinoises, qui est bien informée sur les activités du parti communiste chinois au Japon, a obtenu cette désinformation de la part de la communauté chinoise de Tokyo dans la nuit du 11 au 12.
Même pour les autorités japonaises chargées de la sécurité publique, il faut du temps pour identifier immédiatement la source de la désinformation.
C'est comme essayer de trouver le premier patient atteint du coronavirus à Wuhan, en Chine.
Le Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office est en état d'alerte concernant la guerre de l'information menée par le gouvernement chinois, y compris la diffusion de fausses informations.
Un autre responsable de la sécurité publique a déclaré : « Nous travaillons d'arrache-pied pour trouver la source et l'objectif de cette affaire. Nous devons être conscients du fait que de fausses informations ont circulé dans la communauté chinoise de Tokyo, qui est composée de Chinois vivant au Japon et de Chinois d'outre-mer ».

Les Chinois d'outre-mer et les ressortissants chinois sont membres du PLD.
Le fait que les candidats à la présidence soient tous pro-Chine ou pro-Chinois est un problème, mais ce qui est plus grave, c'est que l'on s'inquiète encore de l'« usurpation d'identité » de ressortissants chinois (ressortissants chinois vivant au Japon et ayant acquis la nationalité japonaise) et de Chinois d'outre-mer (ressortissants chinois vivant au Japon) par des membres du PLD et des amis du parti qui ont le droit de voter lors de l'élection présidentielle. 
Le PLD stipule que l'adhésion est ouverte aux « personnes âgées de 18 ans ou plus et de nationalité japonaise ».
Cependant, en réalité, dans la plupart des cas, ils ne demandent même pas de pièce d'identité.
Une connaissance du parti préfectoral du PLD m'a confié : « Ils ne demandent même pas une copie du registre de famille ou un passeport ou ne vérifient pas le journal officiel, c'est donc presque comme s'il n'y avait pas de contrôle du tout ».
Le fait que ce soit la personne qui est présentée, et non la personne elle-même, qui effectue le processus de demande d'adhésion ajoute également au manque de transparence qui entoure l'adhésion à un parti.
Même les membres du parlement révèlent rarement leur nationalité ou leurs antécédents, et c'est un secret de polichinelle qu'il y a un nombre considérable de citoyens japonais naturalisés au sein du PLD et des partis d'opposition.
On pense que de nombreux membres du PLD naturalisés pourraient être contraints de suivre les instructions de Pékin en cas de crise à Taïwan, par intimidation ou au moyen d'une stratégie d'adoucissement.
Se pourrait-il que la tentative de simplifier les procédures administratives afin d'augmenter rapidement le nombre de membres du parti se soit retournée contre lui ?
Même parmi les Chinois qui ont acquis la nationalité japonaise, nombreux sont ceux qui « ont le coeur en Chine ».
Il convient de noter que, comme l'a expliqué l'espionne chinoise de New York dans la dernière partie de cet article, de nombreuses personnes naturalisées dans le pays où elles ont immigré ont encore la mentalité de suivre les ordres de Pékin et de rester loyales envers leur mère patrie.

Les parrains des « billets du parti » sont des ressortissants chinois.
En plus de se faire passer pour des membres du parti, des ressortissants chinois ont également acheté des billets de parti (party tickets) pour les partis de faction du Parti libéral démocrate.
Le Kouchikai, auquel appartenait Fumio Kishida, a organisé une soirée de collecte de fonds politiques intitulée « Kouchikai and Talk » en mai 2019, 2022 et 2023, et il a été découvert, grâce à des vidéos et à d'autres médias affiliés à la Chine, que de nombreux groupes et individus chinois avaient participé à cette soirée.
ont participé à l'événement, comme le montrent des vidéos et d'autres médias affiliés à la Chine.
Selon ces sources, des groupes chinois étaient les principaux sponsors de l'événement, qui coûtait 20 000 yens par personne.
Il est impossible qu'un groupe ou un individu chinois soit excentrique au point de fournir de l'argent sans rien dire.
En fait, la représentante d'un groupe chinois de Nagoya est montée sur scène pour faire un discours.
À ce moment-là, elle faisait simplement la promotion de son entreprise.
Toutefois, rien ne garantit que la partie chinoise, qui est devenue un sponsor de grande valeur de la faction du PLD, ne fera pas pression sur le Japon pour que la situation évolue d'une manière qui convienne à la Chine dans des questions qui ébranlent les fondements du pays, telles que la politique étrangère et la politique de sécurité du Japon. 
En d'autres termes, il n'est pas surprenant que la Chine ait l'intention de faire dire à Mogi « shei, shei » (oui, oui), conformément aux souhaits de la Chine sur des questions telles que les îles Senkaku, que la Chine qualifie de « questions sensibles ».
En ce qui concerne les tickets de parti, le seuil de divulgation des acheteurs a été abaissé de plus de 200 000 yens à plus de 50 000 yens à la suite de l'affaire de la « caisse noire » impliquant la faction du PLD, mais là n'est pas le problème. La loi actuelle a deux poids, deux mesures : il est illégal pour les étrangers de faire des dons, mais il n'y a pas de problème à ce qu'ils achètent des billets pour le parti.
Elle est devenue un foyer de financement pour les puissances étrangères.
La loi sur le contrôle des fonds politiques interdit les dons d'étrangers et d'entreprises étrangères dans le but de prévenir l'influence étrangère sur la politique.
Par conséquent, l'achat de billets de parti par des étrangers devrait également être illégal.

Ils profitent de la fragilité de la démocratie.
Ce que je veux souligner, c'est que nous devrions être à l'affût d'une intervention directe et indirecte dans la dissolution de la Chambre des représentants et les élections générales à venir, grâce à l'utilisation par la Chine des médias sociaux et de la désinformation dans le cadre d'une campagne de guerre cognitive, ainsi que d'une subversion psychologique utilisant la force militaire et d'autres moyens.
C'est le modus operandi des États totalitaires que d'attaquer les points faibles des pays démocratiques.
Cette stratégie met en pratique la stratégie de Sun Tzu « Saisir l'initiative » (Jun Shu Qian Yang).
Si vous pouvez trouver la moindre ouverture, vous devez l'exploiter à votre avantage.
Pendant les périodes de transition du pouvoir, les pays autoritaires comme la Chine et la Russie essaieront presque certainement de tirer parti de la situation d'une manière ou d'une autre. 
Le 26 août, un avion militaire chinois de premier plan, qui recueillait des informations, a violé pour la première fois l'espace aérien des îles Goto de la préfecture de Nagasaki.
Le 19 août, un ressortissant chinois a détourné la chaîne publique NHK, débitant des insanités telles que « les îles Senkaku sont un territoire chinois ». N'oubliez pas le massacre de Nankin. N'oubliez pas les femmes de réconfort ».
L'homme qui a écrit des graffitis sur le sanctuaire de Yasukuni pourrait également rentrer au Japon en toute sécurité.
Le 18 septembre, un jeune Japonais a été poignardé à mort à Fukagawa, en Chine.
C'est le jour où l'incident de Mandchourie a éclaté, et il est possible qu'il s'agisse d'une explosion de haine à l'égard des Japonais à un moment où les autorités chinoises encourageaient le sentiment antijaponais.
Tout cela s'est déroulé en même temps que l'élection présidentielle du Parti libéral-démocrate, qui battait son plein après que Fumio Kishida eut annoncé qu'il ne se présenterait pas à l'élection.
La Russie a également secoué le Japon au début du mois de septembre de cette année en envoyant des informations selon lesquelles le président Poutine effectuerait un atterrissage forcé dans les Territoires du Nord après avoir visité la Mongolie.
Cet article continue.

2024/10/6 in Umeda

Sie nutzen die Fragilität der Demokratie aus.

2024年10月08日 14時55分57秒 | 全般

Der folgende Text stammt aus der Novemberausgabe des Monatsmagazins WiLL, das am 26. September veröffentlicht wurde.
Nicht nur für japanische Bürger, sondern für Menschen weltweit ist es eine Pflichtlektüre.
Hat China Shigeru Ishiba manipuliert?
Rui Sasaki, Journalist, Professor an der Fakultät für Internationale Studien, Reitaku-Universität
Der Schatten Chinas hinter der „überwältigenden Überlegenheit“, die in Nagatacho herumläuft
Kandidaten voller pro-chinesischer und pro-chinesischer Gefühle
Der eigentliche Drahtzieher hinter der LDP-Präsidentschaftswahl war die Kommunistische Partei Chinas.
Wie sollte Japan mit einem China umgehen, das sich weltweit arrogant verhält und militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Druck ausübt, um Japan in eine untergeordnete Position zu zwingen?
Dieser Punkt muss zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels noch eingehend hinterfragt werden.
Wenn die LDP-Präsidentschaftswahl, bei der es sich im Grunde um eine Wahl des Premierministers handelt, so wie sie ist, zu Ende geht, wird sie ein schlechtes Erbe für die Zukunft hinterlassen.
China wird wahrscheinlich weiterhin die LDP-Mitglieder, die für die Präsidentschaft kandidiert und etwas Prestige erlangt haben, nutzen, um seine Pläne zur Verbreitung von Informationen und zur Lenkung von Vorteilen zu seinen Gunsten hinter den Kulissen zu stärken.
Wir müssen den Worten und Taten der LDP-Gesetzgeber, die für das Präsidentenamt kandidieren, noch mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken als in der Vergangenheit.
Ich habe mir die Kandidaten angesehen, mit Ausnahme von Frau Takaichi Sanae.
Die Präsidentschaftswahl wurde von pro-chinesischen Politikern dominiert.
Das Familienunternehmen von Taro Kono, Staatsminister für Digitalpolitik, Nihon Terminal (Hauptsitz: Hiratsuka City, Präfektur Kanagawa; Präsident: Jiro Kono), unterhält enge Beziehungen zu chinesischen Unternehmen.
Es wurde auch festgestellt, dass das Logo eines chinesischen Unternehmens auf den Materialien eines Expertengremiums des Kabinetts angebracht war, das über erneuerbare Energien diskutierte.
Einige Leute flüsterten, dass dieser Schritt darauf abzielte, Gewinne an Nihon Terminal zu leiten.
Die Besorgnis, dass „das Familienunternehmen Vorrang vor nationalen Interessen hat“ (LDP-Abgeordneter), wurde auch durch die Präsidentschaftswahlen nicht zerstreut. 
Als Außenminister besuchte Herr Kono Ende Januar 2018 China.
Er machte ein Foto mit dem chinesischen Sprecher Hua Chunying, der einen niedrigeren Rang innehat, und postete es auf seinem Twitter-Account, wobei er sich selbstgefällig zu zeigen schien. 
Wenn Herr Kono der Yokozuna (Großmeister) der pro-chinesischen Fraktion im Westen ist, dann ist der Kabinettschef, Herr Yoshimasa Hayashi, der ehemalige Vorsitzende der Japan-China Friendship League, der sich selbst als „chinesenfreundliche Fraktion“ bezeichnet und der oberste Aufseher des japanisch-chinesischen Handels ist, der Yokozuna des Ostens. 
Auf einer Pressekonferenz sagte Herr Hayashi, dass er, falls er Premierminister und LDP-Präsident wird, ein Treffen der zuständigen Kabinettsminister einberufen werde, um Maßnahmen im Umgang mit den maritimen Bojen zu erörtern, die China in der ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone (AWZ) Japans um die Senkaku-Inseln (Stadt Ishigaki, Präfektur Okinawa) installiert hat.
Das kommt der Aussage gleich, dass sie diese aus Rücksicht auf China nicht entfernen.
Als Premierminister sollte er einfach ihre Entfernung anordnen.
Es ist ein schlechtes Beispiel dafür, wie eine Person so korrupt werden kann, dass sie bei jedem Besuch in China begeistert empfangen wird.
Als der chinesische Außenminister Wang Yi im November 2020 Japan besuchte, sagte er auf einer gemeinsamen Pressekonferenz nach dem Treffen der Außenminister Japans und Chinas, dass „die Senkaku-Inseln chinesisches Territorium sind“.
Dennoch antwortete Generalsekretär Toshimitsu Motegi mit „Shei, Shei“, ohne ihn zu widerlegen.
Darüber hinaus sprach er Worte des Dankes aus, die darauf hindeuteten, dass er die Senkaku-Inseln verkaufen würde.
Er wurde als ungeeignet für das Amt des Premierministers und des LDP-Präsidenten entlarvt.
Zu diesem Zeitpunkt hätte er erkennen müssen, dass er nicht mehr die Qualifikationen hatte, um Premierminister und LDP-Präsident zu sein.
Zu den Unterstützern von Shigeru Ishiba gehören viele pro-chinesische Persönlichkeiten.
Unter denjenigen, die ihn empfohlen haben, ist der Abgeordnete Taira Masaaki, der als Vizepräsident der Japan-China Development Association (Vorsitzender Kono Taro) fungiert, einer allgemeinen eingetragenen Vereinigung, die sich der Förderung des Austauschs zwischen kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen in Japan und China widmet.

Falsche Informationen verbreiten sich in Nagatacho:
Im Fall von Herrn Ishiba bestand der Verdacht, dass er von chinesischer Seite als Schachfigur benutzt wurde.
Es war die Nacht vor dem offiziellen Beginn der Präsidentschaftswahlen.
Laut zuverlässigen Quellen wurden die Ergebnisse einer Meinungsumfrage, die die LDP-Zentrale am 8. September unter Parteimitgliedern durchgeführt hatte, in Nagatacho und Kasumigaseki verbreitet. 
Die Umfrage soll unter 2.162 Personen der 1 Million Parteimitglieder und -anhänger durchgeführt worden sein und die Ergebnisse waren wie folgt:

  • 34,9 % für Herrn Ishiba
  • 23,2 % für den ehemaligen Umweltminister Herrn Koizumi
  • 15,9 % für die Staatsministerin für Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitspolitik Frau Sanae Takaichi

Es ist offensichtlich, dass die Ergebnisse unnatürlich sind.
Das liegt daran, dass die Zahlen zeigen, dass Herr Ishiba mit überwältigender Mehrheit vor den anderen Kandidaten liegt.
Der Abstand zwischen Herrn Koizumi, der auf dem zweiten Platz liegt, und Frau Takaichi, die auf dem dritten Platz liegt, ist ebenfalls so groß, dass es unmöglich scheint, ihn aufzuholen. 
Wenn Frau Takaichi es auf den zweiten Platz schaffen würde, bestünde die Möglichkeit einer Umkehrung des Ergebnisses bei der Schlussabstimmung.
Dennoch vermittelten diese Zahlen die Botschaft: „Ishiba und Koizumi werden die ersten beiden Plätze belegen, und es besteht keine Chance, dass Frau Takaichi in die Schlussabstimmung kommt. Sie sollten also auf das Siegerpferd umsteigen und Ihre Unterstützung für Frau Takaichi aufgeben.“ 
Die LDP-Zentrale hat in der Vergangenheit noch nie eine öffentliche Meinungsumfrage für die Präsidentschaftswahlen durchgeführt, um Fairness zu gewährleisten.
Der Autor hat auch viele Jahre lang über die Präsidentschaftswahlen in der politischen Arena berichtet, aber noch nie davon gehört.
Der Hintergrund für das Auftauchen unbegründeter, falscher Informationen am Tag vor der offiziellen Bekanntgabe, die auch vom Leiter des Wahlvorbereitungskomitees der LDP dementiert wurden, wurde als „eine große Kraft am Werk“ (laut Personen, die dem stellvertretenden Premierminister Taro Aso nahestehen) angesehen, die versuchte, die Initiative bei der Wahl der Führung zu ergreifen und einen Trend zugunsten von Herrn Ishiba zu schaffen. 
Ein solches Maß an Desinformation ist eine Idee, die selbst ein Neuling in der Welt der Wahlen haben könnte.
Was beachtet werden muss, ist die Macht der Verbreitung und Anziehungskraft.
Nur eine begrenzte Anzahl von Kräften kann Informationen in der politischen, bürokratischen und geschäftlichen Welt so weit verbreiten, dass diejenigen, die die Desinformation erhalten, sie am Ende glauben.
Ich habe von mehreren Personen, die in die Angelegenheit verwickelt waren, Desinformationen erhalten.
Das erste, was mir in den Sinn kommt, sind die Medien.
Wenn die Endempfänger der Falschinformationen die Verbraucher sind, ist es wie bei einem Einzelhändler, der Waren von den Herstellern über Großhändler erhält und sie dann an die Verbraucher liefert.
Wer ist also der Drahtzieher hinter der Produktion von Desinformationen, der Großhändler von Desinformationen an den Mittelsmann?
Das Lager von Herrn Ishiba ist nicht die Quelle der Desinformationen.
Sie würden so etwas nicht tun, und sie haben nicht die Macht dazu.
Die Existenz der Zentralen Arbeitsabteilung der Vereinigten Front der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (Abteilung für die Vereinigte Front) lauert im Hintergrund.
Das liegt daran, dass sogar ein chinesischer Bekannter von mir, der über die Aktivitäten der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas in Japan gut informiert ist, diese Falschinformationen in der Nacht des 11. von der chinesischen Gemeinschaft in Tokio erhalten hat.
Selbst für die japanischen Behörden für öffentliche Sicherheit dauert es eine Weile, die Quelle von Falschinformationen sofort zu identifizieren.
Es ist wie der Versuch, den ersten Coronavirus-Patienten in Wuhan, China, zu finden.
Das Kabinettsamt für Nachrichtendienste und Forschung ist in höchster Alarmbereitschaft, was den Informationskrieg der chinesischen Regierung betrifft, einschließlich der Verbreitung falscher Informationen.
Ein anderer Beamter der öffentlichen Sicherheit sagte: „Wir arbeiten hart daran, die Quelle und das Ziel dessen zu finden. Wir müssen uns der Tatsache bewusst sein, dass in der chinesischen Gemeinschaft in Tokio, die sich aus in Japan lebenden Chinesen und Auslandschinesen zusammensetzt, falsche Informationen kursierten.“

Überseechinesen und chinesische Staatsangehörige sind Mitglieder der LDP.
Die Tatsache, dass alle Präsidentschaftskandidaten pro-chinesisch oder pro-chinesisch sind, ist ein Problem, aber noch schwerwiegender ist, dass es immer noch Bedenken hinsichtlich der „Verkörperung“ von chinesischen Staatsangehörigen (in Japan lebende chinesische Staatsangehörige, die die japanische Staatsangehörigkeit erworben haben) und Überseechinesen (in Japan lebende chinesische Staatsangehörige) durch LDP-Mitglieder und Parteifreunde gibt, die das Recht haben, an der Präsidentschaftswahl teilzunehmen. 
Die LDP schreibt vor, dass die Mitgliedschaft „allen Personen ab 18 Jahren mit japanischer Staatsangehörigkeit“ offensteht.
In der Realität wird jedoch in den meisten Fällen nicht einmal ein Ausweis verlangt.
Ein Bekannter der LDP-Partei auf Präfekturebene vertraute mir an: „Sie verlangen nicht einmal eine Kopie des Familienbuchs oder des Reisepasses oder überprüfen das Amtsblatt, sodass es fast so aussieht, als würde überhaupt keine Überprüfung stattfinden.“
Die Tatsache, dass die Person, die vorgestellt wird, und nicht die Person selbst, den Antrag auf Mitgliedschaft stellt, trägt ebenfalls zur mangelnden Transparenz bei der Parteimitgliedschaft bei.
Selbst Parlamentsmitglieder geben selten ihre Nationalität oder ihren Hintergrund preis, und es ist ein offenes Geheimnis, dass es in der LDP und den Oppositionsparteien eine beträchtliche Anzahl eingebürgerter japanischer Staatsbürger gibt.
Es wird vermutet, dass viele eingebürgerte LDP-Mitglieder im Falle einer Krise in Taiwan usw. durch Einschüchterung oder eine Strategie der Aufweichung gezwungen werden könnten, den Anweisungen Pekings zu folgen.
Könnte es sein, dass der Versuch, die Verwaltungsabläufe zu vereinfachen, um die Parteimitgliedschaft schnell zu erweitern, nach hinten losgegangen ist?
Selbst unter Chinesen, die die japanische Staatsbürgerschaft angenommen haben, sind viele „mit dem Herzen in China“.
Es sollte angemerkt werden, dass, wie die chinesische Spionin in New York, die im letzten Teil dieses Artikels vorgestellt wurde, viele Menschen, die in dem Land, in das sie eingewandert sind, eingebürgert wurden, immer noch die Mentalität haben, Befehle aus Peking zu befolgen und ihrem Mutterland treu zu bleiben.

„Parteitickets“ werden von chinesischen Staatsangehörigen gesponsert.
Chinesische Staatsangehörige geben nicht nur vor, Parteimitglieder zu sein, sondern haben auch Parteitickets (Parteitickets) für die Parteifraktionen der Liberaldemokratischen Partei gekauft.
Die Kouchikai, der Fumio Kishida angehörte, veranstaltete im Mai 2019, 2022 und 2023 eine politische Fundraising-Party namens „Kouchikai and Talk“, und es wurde durch Videos und andere Medien von mit China verbundenen Medien aufgedeckt, dass viele chinesische
Gruppen und Einzelpersonen an der Veranstaltung teilgenommen haben, wie aus Videos und anderen Medien von mit China verbundenen Medien hervorgeht.
Diesen Quellen zufolge waren chinesische Gruppen die Hauptsponsoren der Veranstaltung, die 20.000 Yen pro Person kostete.
Es ist ausgeschlossen, dass eine chinesische Gruppe oder Einzelperson so exzentrisch wäre, Geld zu geben, aber keine Worte.
Tatsächlich trat die weibliche Vertreterin einer chinesischen Gruppe aus Nagoya auf die Bühne, um eine Rede zu halten.
Zu diesem Zeitpunkt warb sie lediglich für ihr Unternehmen.
Es gibt jedoch keine Garantie dafür, dass die chinesische Seite, die zu einem wichtigen Sponsor der LDP-Fraktion wurde, nicht Druck auf Japan ausüben wird, um Situationen in einer Weise zu entwickeln, die für China in Fragen, die die Grundfesten des Landes erschüttern, wie z. B. die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Japans, von Vorteil ist. 
Anders ausgedrückt ist es nicht überraschend, dass China möglicherweise plant, Mogi dazu zu bringen, in Fragen wie den Senkaku-Inseln, die China als „sensible Themen“ bezeichnet, „shei, shei“ (ja, ja) zu sagen, was Chinas Wünschen entspricht.
Was die Parteitickets betrifft, so wurde die Schwelle für die Offenlegung der Käufer im Zuge der „Slush-Fund“-Affäre, in die die LDP-Fraktion verwickelt war, von über 200.000 Yen auf über 50.000 Yen gesenkt, aber das ist nicht das Problem. Das derzeitige Gesetz hat insofern eine Doppelmoral, als es für Ausländer illegal ist, Spenden zu tätigen, es aber in Ordnung ist, Parteitickets zu kaufen.
Es ist zu einer Brutstätte für die Finanzierung durch ausländische Mächte geworden.
Das Gesetz zur Kontrolle politischer Gelder verbietet Spenden von Ausländern und ausländischen Unternehmen, um den Einfluss des Auslands auf die Politik zu verhindern.
Dann sollte auch der Kauf von Parteitickets durch Ausländer illegal sein.

Sie nutzen die Schwäche der Demokratie aus.
Ich möchte betonen, dass wir bei der bevorstehenden Auflösung des Repräsentantenhauses und den allgemeinen Wahlen auf direkte und indirekte Interventionen achten sollten, die China mithilfe von sozialen Medien und Desinformation im Rahmen einer Kampagne der kognitiven Kriegsführung sowie psychologischer Subversion unter Einsatz militärischer Gewalt und anderer Mittel durchführt.
Es ist die Vorgehensweise totalitärer Staaten, die Schwachstellen demokratischer Länder anzugreifen.
Diese Strategie setzt Sun Tzus „Die Initiative ergreifen“ (Jun Shu Qian Yang) in die Praxis um.
Wenn Sie auch nur die kleinste Öffnung finden, sollten Sie sie zu Ihrem Vorteil nutzen.
In Zeiten des Machtwechsels werden autoritäre Länder wie China und Russland mit ziemlicher Sicherheit versuchen, die Situation in irgendeiner Weise auszunutzen. 
Am 26. August verletzte ein bekanntes chinesisches Militärflugzeug, das Informationen sammelte, zum ersten Mal den Luftraum der Goto-Inseln in der Präfektur Nagasaki.
Am 19. August entführte ein chinesischer Staatsbürger den öffentlich-rechtlichen Sender NHK und verbreitete Unsinn wie „Die Senkaku-Inseln sind chinesisches Territorium. Vergesst nicht das Massaker von Nanking. Vergesst nicht die Trostfrauen.“
Der Mann, der den Yasukuni-Schrein mit Graffiti beschmierte, konnte ebenfalls sicher nach Japan zurückkehren.
Am 18. September wurde ein japanischer Junge in Fukagawa, China, erstochen.
Es war der Tag, an dem der Mandschurische Zwischenfall ausbrach, und es ist möglich, dass dies eine Ausdrucksform des Hasses gegen die Japaner war, zu einer Zeit, als die chinesischen Behörden antijapanische Ressentiments schürten.
All dies geschah zur gleichen Zeit wie die Präsidentschaftswahlen der Liberaldemokratischen Partei, die in vollem Gange waren, nachdem Fumio Kishida angekündigt hatte, dass er nicht zur Wahl antreten würde.
Russland erschütterte die japanische Seite Anfang September dieses Jahres auch durch die Nachricht, dass Präsident Putin nach seinem Besuch in der Mongolei in den nördlichen Gebieten eine Notlandung durchführen würde.
Dieser Artikel wird fortgesetzt.

2024/10/6 in Umeda

Se están aprovechando de la fragilidad de la democracia.

2024年10月08日 14時54分24秒 | 全般

Lo que sigue pertenece al número de noviembre de la revista mensual WiLL, que salió a la venta el 26 de septiembre.
Es una lectura obligada no sólo para los ciudadanos japoneses, sino para todo el mundo.
¿Ha manipulado China a Shigeru Ishiba?
Rui Sasaki, periodista, profesor de la Facultad de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad Reitaku
La sombra de China tras la «aplastante superioridad» que ha estado recorriendo Nagatacho
Candidatos llenos de sentimientos prochinos y prochinos 
El verdadero cerebro detrás de la elección presidencial del PLD fue el Partido Comunista Chino.
¿Cómo debe tratar Japón a una China que se comporta con arrogancia en todo el mundo y utiliza la presión militar y económica para forzar a Japón a una posición subordinada?
En el momento de escribir estas líneas aún no se ha cuestionado rigurosamente este punto.
Si la elección presidencial del PLD, que es, de hecho, una elección de primer ministro, cierra el telón como lo está haciendo, dejará un mal legado para el futuro.
China probablemente seguirá utilizando a los miembros del PLD que se han presentado a la presidencia y han ganado cierto prestigio para reforzar sus planes de difundir información y orientar los beneficios a su favor entre bastidores.
Debemos prestar aún más atención que en el pasado a las palabras y acciones de los legisladores del PLD que se presentan a la presidencia.
He examinado a los candidatos, excepto a la Sra. Takaichi Sanae.
La elección presidencial estuvo dominada por políticos pro-China.
La empresa familiar del secretario de Estado de Política Digital, Taro Kono, Nihon Terminal (sede: ciudad de Hiratsuka, prefectura de Kanagawa; presidente: Jiro Kono), mantiene estrechos vínculos con empresas chinas.
También se descubrió que el logotipo de una empresa china figuraba en los materiales de un grupo de expertos de la Oficina del Gabinete que debatía sobre las energías renovables.
Algunas personas murmuraron que la maniobra pretendía dirigir los beneficios a Nihon Terminal.
La preocupación de que «se está dando prioridad a los negocios familiares sobre los intereses nacionales» (diputado del PLD) no se ha disipado ni siquiera con las elecciones presidenciales. 
Como ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Kono visitó China a finales de enero de 2018.
Se hizo una foto con la portavoz china Hua Chunying, de rango inferior, y la publicó en su cuenta de Twitter, aparentando estar satisfecho consigo mismo. 
Si el Sr. Kono es el Yokozuna (gran campeón) de la facción pro-China en Occidente, entonces el Secretario Jefe del Gabinete, el Sr. Yoshimasa Hayashi, que es el ex presidente de la Liga de Amistad Japón-China y que se autodenomina «facción favorable a China» y es el supervisor general del comercio Japón-China, es el Yokozuna de Oriente. 
En una rueda de prensa, Hayashi afirmó que, si se convierte en primer ministro y presidente del PLD, convocará una reunión de los ministros pertinentes del gabinete para estudiar medidas para hacer frente a las boyas marítimas que China ha instalado en la zona económica exclusiva (ZEE) de Japón alrededor de las islas Senkaku (ciudad de Ishigaki, prefectura de Okinawa).
Equivale a decir que no las retiran por consideración a China.
Como primer ministro, debería simplemente ordenar su retirada.
Es un mal ejemplo de cómo una persona puede llegar a ser tan corrupta que es recibida con entusiasmo cada vez que visita China.
Cuando el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores chino, Wang Yi, visitó Japón en noviembre de 2020, dijo en una rueda de prensa conjunta tras la reunión de ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de Japón y China que «las islas Senkaku son territorio chino.»
Aun así, el secretario general Toshimitsu Motegi respondió con un «Shei, Shei» sin refutarle.
Además, pronunció palabras de agradecimiento que parecían dar a entender que vendería las islas Senkaku.
Quedó al descubierto que no era apto ni para primer ministro ni para presidente del PLD.
En ese momento, debería haberse dado cuenta de que ya no reunía los requisitos para ser primer ministro y presidente del PLD. 
Entre los partidarios de Shigeru Ishiba hay muchas figuras pro-China.
Entre los que le recomendaron, Taira Masaaki, miembro de la Cámara de Representantes, es vicepresidente de la Asociación de Desarrollo Japón-China (presidente Kono Taro), una asociación general constituida dedicada a promover los intercambios entre pequeñas y medianas empresas de Japón y China.

En Nagatacho se difundió información falsa:
En el caso del Sr. Ishiba, hubo sospechas de que estaba siendo utilizado como peón por la parte china.
Era la noche anterior al inicio oficial de las elecciones presidenciales.
Según fuentes fidedignas, los resultados de una encuesta de opinión pública que la sede del PLD realizó el 8 de septiembre entre los miembros del partido se difundieron por Nagatacho y Kasumigaseki. 
Se dice que la encuesta se realizó a 2.162 personas de entre el millón de miembros y simpatizantes del partido, y los resultados fueron los siguientes:

  • 34,9% para el Sr. Ishiba
  • 23,2% para el ex ministro de Medio Ambiente, Koizumi
  • 15,9% para la Secretaria de Estado de Política Económica y de Seguridad, Sanae Takaichi.

Es evidente que los resultados no son naturales.
Y es que las cifras muestran que el Sr. Ishiba está abrumadoramente por delante de los demás candidatos.
La diferencia entre el Sr. Koizumi, que ocupa el segundo lugar, y la Sra. Takaichi, que ocupa el tercero, es también tan grande que parece imposible de recuperar. 
Si la Sra. Takaichi llegara al segundo puesto, existiría la posibilidad de un vuelco en la votación final.
Aun así, estas cifras transmitían el mensaje de que «Ishiba y Koizumi son los que acabarán primero y segundo, y no hay ninguna posibilidad de que la Sra. Takaichi pase a la votación final, así que deberías pasarte al caballo ganador y renunciar a tu apoyo a la Sra. Takaichi». 
La sede central del PLD nunca ha realizado una encuesta de opinión pública para las elecciones presidenciales en el pasado para garantizar la imparcialidad.
El autor también ha cubierto las elecciones presidenciales durante muchos años en el ámbito político, pero nunca ha oído hablar de ello.
El trasfondo de la aparición de información falsa y sin fundamento el día anterior al anuncio oficial, que también fue desmentida por el jefe del comité de gestión electoral del PLD, fue la idea de que «una gran fuerza está trabajando» (según personas cercanas al viceprimer ministro Taro Aso) para intentar hacerse con la iniciativa en la elección del liderazgo y crear una tendencia a favor del Sr. Ishiba. 
Este nivel de desinformación es una idea que incluso a un novato en el mundo de las elecciones se le podría ocurrir.
Lo que hay que tener en cuenta es el poder de difusión y apelación.
Sólo un número limitado de fuerzas puede difundir ampliamente la información por el mundo político, burocrático y empresarial hasta el punto de que quienes reciben la desinformación acaben creyéndosela.
Recibí desinformación de varias personas implicadas en el asunto. 
Lo primero que me viene a la mente son los medios de comunicación.
Si los destinatarios finales de la información falsa son los consumidores, es como un minorista que recibe mercancías de los productores a través de mayoristas y luego las entrega a los consumidores.
Entonces, ¿quién es el cerebro detrás de la producción de desinformación, el mayorista de desinformación al intermediario?
El bando del Sr. Ishiba no es la fuente de la desinformación.
Ellos no harían algo tan astuto, y no tienen el poder para hacerlo.
La existencia del Departamento Central de Trabajo del Frente Unido del Partido Comunista Chino (Departamento del Frente Unido) acecha en el trasfondo.
Incluso un conocido mío chino, que está bien informado sobre las actividades del Partido Comunista Chino en Japón, obtuvo esta desinformación de la comunidad china en Tokio la noche del 11.
Incluso a las autoridades de seguridad pública japonesas les lleva tiempo identificar inmediatamente la fuente de desinformación.
Es como intentar encontrar al primer paciente de coronavirus en Wuhan, China.
La Oficina de Inteligencia e Investigación del Gabinete está en alerta máxima respecto a la guerra informativa del gobierno chino, incluida la difusión de información falsa.
Otro funcionario de seguridad pública declaró: «Estamos trabajando duro para encontrar la fuente y el objetivo de esto. Tenemos que ser conscientes de que circulaba información falsa en la comunidad china de Tokio, formada por chinos residentes en Japón y chinos de ultramar».

Los chinos de ultramar y los nacionales chinos son miembros del PLD.
El hecho de que los candidatos a la presidencia sean todos prochinos o prochinas es un problema, pero lo más grave es que sigue preocupando la «suplantación» de ciudadanos chinos (ciudadanos chinos residentes en Japón que han adquirido la nacionalidad japonesa) y chinos de ultramar (ciudadanos chinos residentes en Japón) por parte de miembros del PLD y amigos del partido con derecho a voto en las elecciones presidenciales. 
El PLD estipula que la afiliación está abierta a «mayores de 18 años y de nacionalidad japonesa».
Sin embargo, en realidad, en la mayoría de los casos, ni siquiera piden identificación.
Un conocido del partido prefectural del PLD me confió: «Ni siquiera piden una copia del libro de familia o del pasaporte ni consultan el boletín oficial, así que es casi como si no hubiera ningún control».
El hecho de que sea la persona que se presenta, y no la persona, la que lleva a cabo el proceso de solicitud de afiliación se suma también a la falta de transparencia que rodea a la afiliación a un partido.
Incluso los parlamentarios rara vez revelan su nacionalidad u origen, y es un secreto a voces que hay un número considerable de ciudadanos japoneses naturalizados en el PLD y los partidos de la oposición.
Se cree que muchos miembros naturalizados del PLD podrían verse obligados a seguir las instrucciones de Pekín en caso de crisis en Taiwán, etc., mediante la intimidación o mediante una estrategia de ablandamiento.
¿Podría ser que el intento de simplificar los procedimientos administrativos para ampliar rápidamente la afiliación al partido haya resultado contraproducente?
Incluso entre los chinos que han adquirido la nacionalidad japonesa, muchos «tienen su corazón en China».
Hay que tener en cuenta que, como la espía china en Nueva York presentó en la última parte de este artículo, muchas personas que se han naturalizado en el país al que emigraron siguen teniendo la mentalidad de seguir las órdenes de Pekín y permanecer leales a su madre patria.

Los patrocinadores del «billete del partido» son ciudadanos chinos.
Además de hacerse pasar por miembros del partido, los nacionales chinos también han comprado «billetes de partido» para los partidos de la facción del Partido Liberal Democrático.
El Kouchikai, al que pertenecía Fumio Kishida, celebró una fiesta política de recaudación de fondos llamada «Kouchikai and Talk» en mayo de 2019, 2022 y 2023, y se ha descubierto a través de vídeos y otros medios de comunicación de medios afiliados chinos que muchos chinos
se descubrió que muchos grupos e individuos chinos participaron en el evento, como se muestra en videos y otros medios de comunicación de medios afiliados a China.
Según estas fuentes, los grupos chinos fueron los principales patrocinadores del evento, que costó 20.000 yenes por persona.
Es imposible que un grupo o individuo chino sea tan excéntrico como para aportar dinero pero no palabras.
De hecho, la representante femenina de un grupo chino de Nagoya subió al escenario para dar un discurso.
En ese momento, se limitaba a promocionar su empresa.
Sin embargo, no hay garantías de que la parte china, que se convirtió en un patrocinador de gran valor de la facción del PLD, no presione a Japón para que desarrolle situaciones de forma conveniente para China en cuestiones que sacuden los cimientos del país, como la política exterior y la política de seguridad de Japón. 
Dicho de otro modo, no es sorprendente que China pueda estar planeando conseguir que Mogi diga «shei, shei» (sí, sí) en línea con los deseos de China en temas como las islas Senkaku, a las que China se refiere como «temas sensibles».
En cuanto a las entradas de los partidos, el umbral para la revelación de los compradores se redujo de más de 200.000 yenes a más de 50.000 yenes a raíz del asunto de los «fondos secretos» en el que estaba implicada la facción del PLD, pero ese no es el problema. La ley actual tiene un doble rasero: es ilegal que los extranjeros hagan donaciones, pero está bien que compren entradas para el partido.
Se ha convertido en un caldo de cultivo para la financiación por parte de potencias extranjeras.
La Ley de Control de Fondos Políticos prohíbe las donaciones de extranjeros y empresas extranjeras desde la perspectiva de impedir la influencia extranjera en la política.
Entonces, la compra de entradas de partidos por extranjeros también debería ser ilegal.

Se aprovechan de la fragilidad de la democracia.
Lo que quiero subrayar es que debemos estar atentos a la intervención directa e indirecta en la próxima disolución de la Cámara de Representantes y las elecciones generales mediante el uso por parte de China de los medios sociales y la desinformación en una campaña de guerra cognitiva, así como la subversión psicológica utilizando la fuerza militar y otros medios.
Es el modus operandi de los Estados totalitarios atacar los puntos débiles de los países democráticos.
Esta estrategia pone en práctica la estrategia de Sun Tzu «Aprovechar la iniciativa» (Jun Shu Qian Yang).
Si puedes encontrar la más mínima abertura, debes explotarla en tu beneficio.
Durante los periodos de transición de poder, es casi seguro que los países autoritarios como China y Rusia intentarán aprovecharse de la situación de alguna manera. 
El 26 de agosto, un destacado avión militar chino, que estaba recopilando información, violó por primera vez el espacio aéreo de las islas Goto, en la prefectura de Nagasaki.
El 19 de agosto, un ciudadano chino secuestró la cadena pública NHK, soltando tonterías como «las islas Senkaku son territorio chino». No olviden la masacre de Nankín. No olviden a las mujeres de solaz».
El hombre que escribió pintadas en el santuario de Yasukuni también pudo regresar a Japón sano y salvo.
El 18 de septiembre, un niño japonés fue apuñalado hasta la muerte en Fukagawa, China.
Fue el día en que estalló el Incidente de Manchuria, y es posible que se tratara de una efusión de odio hacia los japoneses en un momento en que las autoridades chinas promovían el sentimiento antijaponés.
Todo esto ocurrió al mismo tiempo que las elecciones presidenciales del Partido Liberal Democrático, que estaban en pleno apogeo después de que Fumio Kishida anunciara que no se presentaría a las elecciones.
Rusia también sacudió al bando japonés a principios de septiembre de este año al enviar la información de que el presidente Putin realizaría un aterrizaje forzoso en los Territorios del Norte tras visitar Mongolia.
Este artículo continúa.

2024/10/6 in Umeda

Stanno approfittando della fragilità della democrazia.

2024年10月08日 14時52分47秒 | 全般

Quanto segue è tratto dal numero di novembre del mensile WiLL, uscito il 26 settembre.
È una lettura obbligata non solo per i cittadini giapponesi, ma anche per quelli di tutto il mondo.
La Cina ha manipolato Shigeru Ishiba?
Rui Sasaki, Giornalista, Professore della Facoltà di Studi Internazionali, Università Reitaku
L'ombra della Cina dietro la “schiacciante superiorità” che si aggira per Nagatacho
Candidati pieni di sentimenti pro-Cina e pro-cinesi 
La vera mente dietro le elezioni presidenziali dell'LDP è il Partito Comunista Cinese.
Come dovrebbe comportarsi il Giappone con una Cina che si comporta in modo arrogante nel mondo e che usa la pressione militare ed economica per costringere il Giappone in una posizione subordinata?
Al momento in cui scriviamo, questo punto non è ancora stato messo rigorosamente in discussione.
Se l'elezione presidenziale dell'LDP, che di fatto è una scelta del primo ministro, chiuderà il suo sipario così com'è, lascerà una cattiva eredità per il futuro.
La Cina probabilmente continuerà a utilizzare i membri dell'LDP che si sono candidati alla presidenza e hanno acquisito un certo prestigio per rafforzare i suoi piani di diffusione delle informazioni e di orientamento dei benefici a suo favore dietro le quinte.
Dobbiamo prestare ancora più attenzione alle parole e alle azioni dei legislatori dell'LDP candidati alla presidenza rispetto al passato.
Ho esaminato i candidati, tranne la signora Takaichi Sanae.
Le elezioni presidenziali sono state dominate da politici filo-cinesi.
L'azienda di famiglia del Ministro per la Politica Digitale Taro Kono, la Nihon Terminal (sede: città di Hiratsuka, prefettura di Kanagawa; presidente: Jiro Kono), ha stretti legami con aziende cinesi.
È stato inoltre scoperto che il logo di un'azienda cinese è stato allegato al materiale di un gruppo di esperti dell'Ufficio di Gabinetto che discute di energie rinnovabili.
Alcuni hanno sussurrato che la mossa mirava a indirizzare i profitti verso Nihon Terminal.
La preoccupazione che “gli affari di famiglia siano prioritari rispetto agli interessi nazionali” (deputato LDP) non è stata dissipata nemmeno dopo le elezioni presidenziali. 
In qualità di ministro degli Esteri, Kono ha visitato la Cina a fine gennaio 2018.
Ha scattato una foto con la portavoce cinese Hua Chunying, di rango inferiore, e l'ha postata sul suo account Twitter, sembrando soddisfatto di sé. 
Se Kono è lo Yokozuna (grande campione) della fazione pro-Cina in Occidente, il Segretario di Gabinetto Yoshimasa Hayashi, ex presidente della Lega dell'Amicizia Giappone-Cina, che si definisce una “fazione amica della Cina” ed è il supervisore generale del commercio Giappone-Cina, è lo Yokozuna dell'Oriente. 
In una conferenza stampa, Hayashi ha dichiarato che se diventerà primo ministro e presidente dell'LDP, organizzerà una riunione dei ministri competenti per valutare le misure da adottare per affrontare le boe marittime che la Cina ha installato nella zona economica esclusiva (ZEE) del Giappone intorno alle isole Senkaku (città di Ishigaki, prefettura di Okinawa).
Equivale a dire che non le stanno rimuovendo per rispetto alla Cina.
Come primo ministro, dovrebbe semplicemente ordinarne la rimozione.
È un brutto esempio di come una persona possa diventare così corrotta da essere accolta con entusiasmo ogni volta che visita la Cina.
Quando il ministro degli Esteri cinese Wang Yi ha visitato il Giappone nel novembre 2020, ha dichiarato in una conferenza stampa congiunta dopo la riunione dei ministri degli Esteri Giappone-Cina che “le isole Senkaku sono territorio cinese”.
Il Segretario generale Toshimitsu Motegi ha risposto con “Shei, Shei” senza confutarlo.
Inoltre, ha pronunciato parole di gratitudine che sembravano implicare che avrebbe venduto le isole Senkaku.
È stato smascherato come inadatto sia come primo ministro che come presidente dell'LDP.
A quel punto, avrebbe dovuto rendersi conto di non avere più le qualifiche per essere primo ministro e presidente dell'LDP. 
Tra i sostenitori di Shigeru Ishiba ci sono molte figure filo-cinesi.
Tra coloro che lo hanno raccomandato, il membro della Camera dei Rappresentanti Taira Masaaki è vicepresidente dell'Associazione per lo Sviluppo Giappone-Cina (presidente Kono Taro), un'associazione generale costituita per promuovere gli scambi tra le piccole e medie imprese in Giappone e in Cina.

Si sono diffuse false informazioni su Nagatacho:
Nel caso del signor Ishiba, c'era il sospetto che venisse usato come pedina dalla parte cinese.
Era la notte prima dell'inizio ufficiale delle elezioni presidenziali.
Secondo fonti attendibili, i risultati di un sondaggio di opinione condotto l'8 settembre dal quartier generale dell'LDP tra i membri del partito sono stati diffusi a Nagatacho e Kasumigaseki. 
Il sondaggio sarebbe stato condotto su 2.162 persone su un milione di membri e sostenitori del partito e i risultati sono stati i seguenti:

  • 34,9% per Ishiba
  • 23,2% per l'ex ministro dell'Ambiente Koizumi
  • 15,9% per il Ministro di Stato per la politica economica e di sicurezza Sanae Takaichi.

È chiaro che i risultati sono innaturali.
I dati mostrano infatti che Ishiba è in testa agli altri candidati.
Anche il divario tra Koizumi, che è al secondo posto, e la signora Takaichi, che è al terzo posto, è così grande che sembra impossibile da recuperare. 
Se la signora Takaichi riuscisse ad arrivare al secondo posto, ci sarebbe la possibilità di un ribaltamento del voto finale.
Tuttavia, queste cifre hanno trasmesso il messaggio che “Ishiba e Koizumi sono quelli che arriveranno al primo e al secondo posto, e non c'è alcuna possibilità per la signora Takaichi di avanzare al voto finale, quindi dovreste passare al cavallo vincente e rinunciare al vostro sostegno per la signora Takaichi”. 
In passato, la sede centrale dell'LDP non ha mai condotto un sondaggio di opinione per le elezioni presidenziali, per garantire l'equità.
Anche l'autore si è occupato per molti anni di elezioni presidenziali in ambito politico, ma non ne ha mai sentito parlare.
La comparsa di informazioni false e prive di fondamento il giorno prima dell'annuncio ufficiale, smentito anche dal capo del comitato di gestione delle elezioni dell'LDP, ha fatto pensare a “una grande forza al lavoro” (secondo persone vicine al vice primo ministro Taro Aso) che cerca di prendere l'iniziativa nelle elezioni per la leadership e di creare una tendenza a favore di Ishiba. 
Questo livello di disinformazione è un'idea che potrebbe venire in mente anche a un novizio del mondo delle elezioni.
Ciò che va notato è il potere di diffusione e di richiamo.
Solo un numero limitato di forze può diffondere informazioni in modo capillare nel mondo politico, burocratico e imprenditoriale, al punto che chi riceve la disinformazione finisce per crederci.
Ho ricevuto disinformazione da diverse persone coinvolte nella vicenda. 
La prima cosa che mi viene in mente sono i media.
Se i destinatari finali delle false informazioni sono i consumatori, è come un rivenditore che riceve le merci dai produttori attraverso i grossisti e poi le consegna ai consumatori.
Quindi, chi è la mente dietro la produzione di disinformazione, il grossista di disinformazione all'intermediario?
Il campo del signor Ishiba non è la fonte della disinformazione.
Non farebbero mai una cosa così astuta e non hanno il potere di farla.
L'esistenza del Dipartimento Centrale del Fronte Unito del Partito Comunista Cinese (Dipartimento del Fronte Unito) si nasconde sullo sfondo.
È perché anche un mio conoscente cinese, che è ben informato sulle attività del Partito Comunista Cinese in Giappone, ha ottenuto questa disinformazione dalla comunità cinese di Tokyo la notte dell'11.
Anche per le autorità di pubblica sicurezza giapponesi ci vuole tempo per identificare immediatamente la fonte della disinformazione.
È come cercare di trovare il primo paziente affetto da coronavirus a Wuhan, in Cina.
Il Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office è in stato di massima allerta per quanto riguarda la guerra dell'informazione del governo cinese, compresa la diffusione di false informazioni.
Un altro funzionario di pubblica sicurezza ha dichiarato: “Stiamo lavorando duramente per trovare la fonte e l'obiettivo di questo fenomeno. Dobbiamo essere consapevoli del fatto che le false informazioni circolavano nella comunità cinese di Tokyo, composta da cinesi che vivono in Giappone e da cinesi d'oltremare”.

I cinesi d'oltremare e i cittadini cinesi sono membri dell'LDP.
Il fatto che i candidati alla presidenza siano tutti pro-Cina o pro-cinesi è un problema, ma ciò che è più grave è che c'è ancora preoccupazione per l'“impersonificazione” di cittadini cinesi (cittadini cinesi che vivono in Giappone e che hanno acquisito la nazionalità giapponese) e cinesi d'oltremare (cittadini cinesi che vivono in Giappone) da parte di membri dell'LDP e amici del partito che hanno il diritto di votare alle elezioni presidenziali. 
L'LDP stabilisce che l'adesione è aperta a “coloro che hanno almeno 18 anni di età e la nazionalità giapponese”.
In realtà, però, nella maggior parte dei casi non viene nemmeno chiesto un documento di identità.
Un conoscente del partito prefettizio LDP mi ha confidato: “Non chiedono nemmeno una copia del registro di famiglia o del passaporto, né controllano la gazzetta ufficiale, quindi è come se non ci fosse alcun controllo”.
Il fatto che sia la persona che viene presentata, anziché la persona stessa, a svolgere il processo di richiesta di adesione, contribuisce alla mancanza di trasparenza che circonda l'appartenenza al partito.
Anche i membri del Parlamento raramente rivelano la loro nazionalità o il loro background, ed è un segreto aperto che ci sia un numero considerevole di cittadini giapponesi naturalizzati nell'LDP e nei partiti di opposizione.
Si pensa che molti membri naturalizzati dell'LDP possano essere costretti a seguire le istruzioni di Pechino in caso di crisi a Taiwan, eccetera, attraverso l'intimidazione o una strategia di ammorbidimento.
È possibile che il tentativo di semplificare le procedure amministrative per espandere rapidamente l'adesione al partito si sia ritorto contro di noi?
Anche tra i cinesi che hanno acquisito la cittadinanza giapponese, molti “hanno il cuore in Cina”.
Va notato che, come la spia cinese a New York ha presentato nell'ultima parte di questo articolo, molte persone naturalizzate nel Paese in cui sono immigrate hanno ancora la mentalità di seguire gli ordini di Pechino e di rimanere fedeli alla madrepatria.

Gli sponsor del “biglietto del partito” sono cittadini cinesi.
Oltre a fingere di essere membri del partito, i cittadini cinesi hanno anche acquistato biglietti di partito (party ticket) per i partiti della fazione del Partito Liberal Democratico.
Il Kouchikai, di cui Fumio Kishida faceva parte, ha tenuto una festa di raccolta fondi politica chiamata “Kouchikai and Talk” nel maggio 2019, 2022 e 2023, ed è stato scoperto attraverso video e altri mezzi di comunicazione provenienti da media affiliati alla Cina che molti gruppi e individui cinesi hanno partecipato alla festa.
gruppi e individui cinesi hanno partecipato all'evento, come mostrano i video e gli altri mezzi di comunicazione di media affiliati alla Cina.
Secondo queste fonti, i gruppi cinesi erano i principali sponsor dell'evento, che costava 20.000 yen a persona.
È impossibile che un gruppo o un individuo cinese sia così eccentrico da fornire denaro ma non parole.
Infatti, la rappresentante di un gruppo cinese di Nagoya è salita sul palco per tenere un discorso.
In quel momento, stava semplicemente promuovendo la sua azienda.
Tuttavia, non c'è alcuna garanzia che la parte cinese, che è diventata uno sponsor di alto valore della fazione LDP, non eserciti pressioni sul Giappone per sviluppare le situazioni in modo conveniente per la Cina in questioni che scuotono le fondamenta del Paese, come la politica estera e la politica di sicurezza del Giappone. 
In altre parole, non è sorprendente che la Cina stia pianificando di far dire a Mogi “shei, shei” (sì, sì) in linea con i desideri della Cina su questioni come le isole Senkaku, che la Cina definisce “questioni sensibili”.
Per quanto riguarda i biglietti del partito, la soglia per la divulgazione degli acquirenti è stata abbassata da oltre 200.000 yen a oltre 50.000 yen sulla scia della questione dei “fondi neri” che ha coinvolto la fazione LDP, ma non è questo il problema. L'attuale legge prevede un doppio standard: è illegale per gli stranieri fare donazioni, ma è lecito per loro acquistare biglietti del partito.
È diventato un focolaio di finanziamenti da parte di potenze straniere.
La legge sul controllo dei fondi politici proibisce le donazioni da parte di stranieri e società straniere, nell'ottica di prevenire l'influenza straniera sulla politica.
Quindi, anche l'acquisto di biglietti di partito da parte di stranieri dovrebbe essere illegale.

Si stanno approfittando della fragilità della democrazia.
Quello che voglio sottolineare è che dovremmo stare attenti a un intervento diretto e indiretto nell'imminente scioglimento della Camera dei Rappresentanti e nelle elezioni generali, attraverso l'uso dei social media e della disinformazione da parte della Cina in una campagna di guerra cognitiva, nonché di sovversione psicologica con l'uso della forza militare e di altri mezzi.
È il modus operandi degli Stati totalitari attaccare i punti deboli dei Paesi democratici.
Questa strategia mette in pratica il principio di Sun Tzu “Cogliere l'iniziativa” (Jun Shu Qian Yang).
Se si riesce a trovare anche la più piccola apertura, bisogna sfruttarla a proprio vantaggio.
Durante i periodi di transizione del potere, i Paesi autoritari come la Cina e la Russia cercheranno quasi certamente di trarre vantaggio dalla situazione in qualche modo. 
Il 26 agosto, un importante aereo militare cinese, che stava raccogliendo informazioni, ha violato per la prima volta lo spazio aereo delle isole Goto della prefettura di Nagasaki.
Il 19 agosto, un cittadino cinese ha dirottato l'emittente pubblica NHK, pronunciando frasi senza senso come “le isole Senkaku sono territorio cinese”. Non dimenticate il massacro di Nanchino. Non dimenticate le donne di conforto”.
Anche l'uomo che ha scritto graffiti sul Santuario di Yasukuni potrebbe tornare in Giappone senza problemi.
Il 18 settembre, un ragazzo giapponese è stato pugnalato a morte a Fukagawa, in Cina.
Era il giorno in cui scoppiava l'Incidente della Manciuria ed è possibile che si trattasse di uno sfogo di odio verso i giapponesi in un momento in cui le autorità cinesi promuovevano il sentimento anti-giapponese.
Tutto questo avveniva in concomitanza con le elezioni presidenziali del Partito Liberal Democratico, in pieno svolgimento dopo che Fumio Kishida aveva annunciato che non si sarebbe candidato alle elezioni.
All'inizio di settembre di quest'anno, inoltre, la Russia ha scosso i giapponesi informandoli che il Presidente Putin avrebbe effettuato un atterraggio forzato nei Territori del Nord dopo aver visitato la Mongolia.
Questo articolo continua.

2024/10/6 in Umeda

立党時に開始した議員への応募者総数が500人を超えている。党員の数が7万人に達している。

2024年10月08日 14時40分05秒 | 全般
今しがた終了した日本保守党の記者会見。
二つの事を知った。
立党時に開始した議員への応募者総数が500人を超えている。
党員の数が7万人に達している。

記者会見での有本香の明晰と胆力は日本保守党の事務総長に相応しい、実に、見事なものだった。
これだけの見事な識見と明晰によって語られた記者会見は、安倍晋三を除いて、日本の政治史上稀有であるといっても過言ではない。

後は、有本香よ。公示日までに、一人でも二人でも候補者を増やして下さい。
来年、7月の参議院選挙までに、700人の党員から一人20,000円の寄付を募って、14億円の浄財を集める事!
そして、今度こそ、全選挙区に候補者を立てる事!
さすれば、日本は、その時から、強く豊かになれる。


2024/10/6 in Umeda, Osaka

日本国民全員が必視聴!!【ゲスト:平井 宏治】R6 10/08 百田尚樹・有本香のニュース生放送 あさ8時! 第473回

2024年10月08日 13時28分57秒 | 全般

【ゲスト:平井 宏治】R6 10/08 百田尚樹・有本香のニュース生放送 あさ8時! 第473回

31分45秒、53分03秒、1時間5分の平井 宏治さんの解説は全国民必視聴!!である。

31分45秒の解説

 

 

1時間5分の平井 宏治さんの解説